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INTRODUCTION

Distinctions between the functions of the legislative and judicial
branches are a staple of debates over statutory interpretation. To
some, the fact that federal judges have no vote in the legislative process supports the argument that a court should implement a statute's
text even when the court's policy inclinations counsel otherwise. In
the view of others, courts can complement Congress's work, for instance by updating obsolete statutes that remain on the books
through congressional inattention or inertia. In such discussions, the
question of a court's authority-or lack thereof-to alter a statutory
text through interpretation implicates a familiar problem of political
theory: the scope of the judicial power and its relation to the legislative power.
Far less attention has been given, however, to courts' interpretation of texts crafted by the judicial branch itself. Pursuant to congressional delegation of authority, the federal judiciary has promulgated
various sets of rules governing civil, criminal, appellate, bankruptcy
and habeas practice. Although some have discussed the implications
of this delegation for the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,' few scholars have addressed the interpretation of other sets of
I

See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top
Down" Grand Theories of
Statutory Construction: A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
75 OR. L. REv. 389, 394-95 (1996) (arguing that interpreters of the Evidence Rules
should give "heightened emphasis" to text and "significant weight" to Advisory Committee Notes); Randolph N.Jonakait, The Supreme Court, PlainMeaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 784-86 (1990) (predicting that a "plain meaning"
approach to interpretation of the Evidence Rules will prevent judges from "adapt[ing]
evidence law to new knowledge and conditions"); Eileen A. Scallen & Andrew E. Tas-
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rules, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This omission is
notable because many aspects of the Civil Rules have a wider and
more direct effect on judicial power than do the Rules of Evidence.
Moreover, those who have addressed the interpretation of the Civil
Rules tend to take as a given that, because Congress has delegated
rulemaking power to the judiciary, the courts should be able freely to
interpret, and alter, the resulting Rules. Thus, the two most extensive
scholarly discussions to date on the subject of the Civil Rules argue
that the Supreme Court's role in promulgating the Rules empowers it
3
to use a more dynamic approach in interpreting them. For example,
Karen Nelson Moore argues that "Congress has... delegated to the
Court rulemaking power, and it is not inconsistent to imply that the
Court has greater power to interpret Rules than it does to interpret
statutes"; accordingly, Judge Moore maintains, the Court should consider itself free to play a "formative role" in "develop [ing]" the Rules
4
in light of its views of purpose and policy. A similar assumption appears to have influenced the behavior of some lower courts. For example, as discussed below, Judges Posner, Easterbrook, and others

litz, Reading the Federal Rules of Evidence Realistically: A Response to Professor Imwinkelried,
75 OR. L. REv. 429, 435 (1996) (defending "hermeneutic and practical reasoning approaches" to interpretation of the Evidence Rules).
2 Interpretation of the Civil Rules presents issues distinct from those that arise
with respect to the Evidence Rules. See EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Whether the FederalRules
of Evidence Should Be Conceived as a PerpetualIndex Code: Blindness Is Worse Than Myopia,
40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1595, 1599 (1999) (criticizing an "analogy to the experience
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" as "inapt in the extreme"). Although a set
of proposed Evidence Rules was drafted in the early 1970s pursuant to the Enabling
Act delegation, Congress passed legislation to block the proposals from taking effect
and ultimately enacted the Rules of Evidence via legislation that made substantive
changes to some of the original proposals and stylistic changes to others. See infra note
16 (describing the process by which Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence).
By contrast, the vast majority of the Civil Rules were neither promulgated nor
amended via legislation; and because a central theme of this Article is the significance
of the rulemaking process to the Rules' interpretation, the scholarship on the Evidence Rules is thus largely inapposite.
3 See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme
Court's Role as Interpreterof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
720, 720 (1988) (arguing that because the Supreme Court promulgates the Rules, federal courts are "fully justified in taking an expansive view of the Federal Rule under
scrutiny, giving it a liberal reading if that is required to fulfill the purposes of the Rule
or to do justice between the parties before the court"); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpretingthe FederalRules of Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039,
1093 (1993) ("Given [the] substantial, although largely unexercised, powers of the
Court in the promulgation process, a more activist role in the interpretative stage, one
that considers purpose and policy, is appropriate.").
4 Moore, supra note 3, at 1093, 1097.
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engaged in a striking judicial amendment of the 1983 version of Rule
11, with dramatic implications for the conduct of litigation in the Seventh Circuit.
Although the view described above may appear to be a truism, I
shall argue that-paradoxically-Congress's delegation of rulemaking
authority should constrain, rather than liberate, courts' interpretation
of the Rules. I begin, in Part I, with a discussion of the rulemaking
process. Under the current structure, an amendment cannot become
law unless it receives the support of several decision-making bodies,
including the Supreme Court, and unless Congress takes no action
(during a specified period) to prevent the amendment from going
into effect. The enabling legislation ensures that lower court judges
and members of the public are represented in some of the decisionmaking bodies, mandates public access to the rulemaking meetings,
and requires that proposed amendments be accompanied by explanatory notes. The public receives an opportunity to comment on proposed amendments, and the proposals are sometimes modified in response to public input. In Part II, I argue that these features of the
rulemaking process constrain any subsequent interpretation of the
Rules: the terms of the delegation make clear that alterations to the
Rules should undergo the process specified in the Enabling Act,
rather than taking effect through judicial fiat in the course of litigation.
Of course, my arguments against judicial "alteration" of the Rules
are not meant to suggest that the Rules will in all instances have a determinate meaning that is evident across time and to all interpreters.
Where appropriate interpretive guides define a Rule's meaning, however, I contend that judges should adhere to that definition. In Part
III, I discuss two possible interpretive guides: the Enabling Act's scope
restriction and the Advisory Committee Notes ("Notes"). The Enabling Act prohibits the Rules from abridging, enlarging, or modifying
substantive rights; the Court, however, has never enforced this restriction directly by invalidating a Rule. Instead, the Court gives the Rules
a presumption of validity, but construes them so as to avoid some of
the resulting Enabling Act problems. This avoidance canon, in its
weak form, can help guide the Court's choice between two otherwise
permissible interpretations of a Rule. I argue, however, that the
Court's application of the avoidance canon in its strong form-to revise a Rule in the face of its text and Note-cannot be justified in light
of the Enabling Act framework. That framework also underpins my
assessment of the Court's approach to the Advisory Committee Notes.
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Although the Court repeatedly makes use of the Notes, as yet it has
been unwilling to concede that it might be bound by them. After reviewing the Court's treatment of the Notes and comparing the Court's
deference to the commentary to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and to agency interpretations of legislative rules, I conclude that
the Court should accord the Notes authoritative effect.
To illustrate these arguments, Parts II and III consider in some detail several aspects of the interpretation and amendment of Rule 11
over the past two decades. These examples, I argue, demonstrate the
difficulties with judicial claims to latitude in interpreting the Rules
and suggest that my proposed approach would help to prevent courts
from unduly enlarging the scope of their interpretive powers.
I.

THE RULEMAKING STRUCTURE

The rules enabling legislation, in its present form, imposes significant procedural requirements on the promulgation of a Rule or
amendment. This Part gives an overview of the current process and
highlights five key features: the requirement of approval by multiple
bodies; the representation (within the decision-making structure) of
several different constituencies; the opportunity for public notice and
comment; the use of explanatory Notes to inform the consideration of
a proposed amendment; and the report-and-wait period for congressional review. In each of these respects, Congress increasingly has
placed statutory constraints on the Supreme Court's rulemaking discretion. I will argue in Parts II and III that these constraints place
corresponding restrictions on the Court's ability to amend the resulting Rules through interpretation.
A.

Overview of the CurrentProcess

A proposed new Rule, or a proposed amendment to an existing
Rule, undergoes at least seven stages of formal comment and review,
in a process involving five separate institutions: the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme
Court, and Congress. The normal procedure is as follows. Proposed
changes-which may be suggested by anyone, including judges, practitioners, academics, and interested members of the public-are analyzed by the Advisory Committee Reporter, who submits the suggestions to the Advisory Committee along with a recommendation for
disposition. The Committee (at its next biannual meeting) then con-
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siders whether to accept, reject, or defer action on each suggestion. If
the Committee accepts the suggestion, it asks the Reporter to prepare
a proposed draft amendment and an explanatory note. The Advisory
Committee then votes on the proposed amendment and its Note, and
(if it approves) seeks permission from the Standing Committee to
publish the proposal.' Once permission is received, the proposed
amendment and Note are circulated for public comment. Following
the comment period, the Advisory Committee reconsiders the proposal in light of the public's input.6 Once the Advisory Committee finally approves the proposed amendment and Note, it submits them to
the Standing Committee. If the Standing Committee approves the
proposal without substantial changes, it forwards the proposed
amendment and Note to the Judicial Conference
Proposals forwarded by the Standing Committee are considered by the Judicial
Conference once a year; the Conference, if it approves a proposal,
transmits it to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court, in turn, approves the proposal, the Chief Justice forwards the amendment's text
and Note to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the amendment is
to take effect. If Congress takes no contrary action, the proposed
amendment becomes effective on December 1.

5 In some instances, permission may be sought from the chair of
the Standing
Committee.
.If the Advisory Committee makes substantial changes, it may provide additional
opportunity for public comment.
7 If the Standing Committee makes a substantial
change to the proposal, it may
return the proposal to the Advisory Committee for further consideration. Sometimes,
however, it forwards the proposal to the Judicial Conference despite making a significant change. Thus, in 1992 the Standing Committee amended the text of the proposed Rule 11 to remove the requirement of mandatory sanctions, and to eliminate
any duty to withdraw a previously filed paper, and recommended that the Judicial Conference approve the amended proposal. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PRODCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT TO THE CHIEFJUSTICE OF
THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES (Sept. 1992), in 146 F.R.D. 515, 517 (1993) (describing the Standing Committee's changes to the Advisory Committee's proposed amendments to Rule 11, and stating the Standing Committee's view that these changes "do not.., require another period of publication and comment"); id. at 518 (recommending that the Judicial
Conference approve the proposed amendments to, inter alia, Rule 11). (The Advisory
Committee's original proposal had been criticized for including the duty to withdraw
papers. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., ET AL., BENCH-BAR PROPOSAL TO REVISE
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 11, at 1, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 159, 162 (1991) (arguing that
the Advisory Committee's proposal "turns a law suit not into a prospective search for
the truth but into a retroactive exercise in perfecting pleadings").)
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B. Multiple Decision Makers

The process did not always involve so many stages of review. The
original delegation, in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, identified only
two decision makers: the Court (which was to promulgate the Rules)
and-implicitly-Congress (which was to have an opportunity to prevent the Rules from taking effect). Congress added a further layer in
1958 (when it directed the Judicial Conference to consider proposed
changes to the Rules) and formally mandated two more layers in 1988
(when it required the involvement of the Standing Committee and set
rules for the composition of any Advisory Committees). The history
thus discloses a trend away from unilateral Supreme Court decision
making and toward a process that includes multiple gatekeepers.
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 authorized the Supreme Court to
prescribe general rules for civil practice and procedure in the federal
district courts, so long as the Rules did not "abridge, enlarge, [or]
modify the substantive rights of any litigant., 8 The Act said little concerning the procedure for promulgation, requiring only that the
Rules be reported to Congress at the beginning of a regular session
and that they not take effect until after the close of that session. 9
8 Act of June 19, 1934, 651, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064.

Rules
merging law and equity practices were subject to the additional requirement that they
preserve the right of trial by jury. See id. § 2, 48 Stat. at 1064 (providing that "in such
union of rules the right of trial byjury ... shall be preserved").
9 Section 1 of the Act provided:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe,
by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts
of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.
They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all
laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Id. § 1, 48 Stat. at 1064.
Section 2 permitted the Court to "unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases
in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both," but provided that "[s]uch united rules shall not take effect until they
shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a
regular session thereof and until after the close of such session." Id. § 2, 48 Stat. at
1064. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, merged law and equity procedures, see FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (providing that the Civil Rules govern federal district court
procedure in all civil suits, subject to specified exceptions); FED. R. Civ. P. 2 (instituting a single form of action), and the Court requested the transmission of the proposed
Rules to Congress as required by the report-and-wait procedure prescribed in section 2
of the Act, see Order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783, 783 (promulgating the Rules "pursuant to Section 2" of the Enabling Act, and directing the ChiefJustice to request that
the Attorney General report the Rules to Congress); Order of Jan. 17, 1938, 302 U.S.
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For the next two decades, the Court employed an Advisory Committee to draft proposed Rules and amendments, which the Court ordinarily transmitted to Congress."
S
11 Occasionally, the Court rejected

rules proposed by the Committee; in one instance the Court promulgated a Rule on its own initiative."
The formality of the drafting and approval process increased in

783, 784 (noting that the Rules had been submitted to Congress).
The timing changed somewhat in 1950, when the Act was amended to specify a
ninety-day report-and-wait period. SeeAct of May 10, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-510, § 2, 64
Stat. 158, 158 (establishing the ninety-day report-and-wait period).
10 In 1935, the Court appointed a group of fourteen lawyers and academics
as an
Advisory Committee to "assist" the Court in preparing the initial set of Rules. See Order of June 3, 1935, 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (appointing the members of the Advisory
Committee). In 1942, the Court designated the Committee as a continuing body, see
Order of January 5, 1942, 314 U.S. 720, 720 (providing for a continuing Advisory
Committee to advise the Court on proposed amendments or additions to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure), and the Committee continued in its advisory role until the
Court discharged it in 1956, see Order of Oct. 1, 1956, 352 U.S. 803, 803 (discharging
the Advisory Committee and revoking the order making the Committee a continuing
body).
11 SeeStephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1015,
1139 (1982) (noting the Supreme Court's alteration of a draft rule on evidence that
the Advisory Committee had proposed in 1937); id. at 1144-45 (describing the Supreme Court's deletion of a draft rule on registration ofjudgments that the Advisory
Committee had proposed in 1937); Charles E. Clark, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
1938-1958: Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435, 442 (1958)
[hereinafter Clark, Federal Rules] (noting the Supreme Court's rejection, in 1948, of
three proposed rules, each of which "presented a problem then before the Court in a
particular case"); id. at 442 & n.36 (noting that in 1948 the Supreme Court directed
the Advisory Committee to reconsider a proposed rule concerning condemnation proceedings and stating that the subsequent changes in the resulting Rule were "thus due
to the direct control of the Court"); Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in
FederalRule-Making, 46 AM. JUD. Soc. 250, 252 (1963) [hereinafter Clark, Role of the Supreme Court] (stating that after proposals made by the Advisory Committee in 1955 "had
provoked discussion and some controversy," the Court discharged the Committee and
"took no action" on the proposed rules, but that the Court eventually adopted some of
these proposals, with revisions, in 1963); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of
the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 677 (1975) ("Although
the Justices generally deferred to the [Advisory] Committee's expertise during [the
period from 1935 to 1956], they at least read and, when appropriate, rejected proposed alterations.").
2 In 1956, "the Court, acting on its own and without recommendation of any
committee," amended Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clark, Role
of the Supreme Court, supra note 11, at 257. This amendment was adopted pursuant to a
separate enabling act, then codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (repealed 1988), authorizing
the promulgation of certain criminal rules. Although the criminal and civil rules enabling acts were not merged until 1988, seeJudicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 404(a) (1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4651 (1988), the procedures required under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 were similar in pertinent part to those set under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
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1958, with the passage of legislation requiring the Judicial Conference
of the United States to "carry on a continuous study of the operation
and effect" of the Rules, and to recommend from time to time "[s] uch
changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem
desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." 13 Pursuant to this mandate, the Judicial
Conference authorized the Chief Justice of the United States (in his
capacity as Chair of the Conference) to appoint a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, as well as a number of advisory committees to report to the Standing Committee on various fields
of procedure. 4 Under the new procedures set by the Judicial Conference, amendments to the Civil Rules typically moved in turn through
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee, the
Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court; if approved by each of
these bodies, an amendment would take effect absent legislation to
the contrary.i5
The structure put in place by the Judicial Conference endured in
substantially the same form for the next three decades;"' but by the
13 Act of July 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356, 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1994)). For a discussion of the Judicial Conference, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
See Albert B. Marls, FederalProceduralRule-making: The Program of theJudicial Conference, 47 A.B.A. J. 772, 772 (1961). The members of the Advisory Committees were
appointed for overlapping terms of four years, and could (under the initial plan) be
reappointed only once. Id. at 774. Over the years, "the need to retain experienced
members and to complete committee projects" would prompt deviations from the oneWINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
term limit on reappointments.
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 10 & n.18 (1981).
15 See BROWN, supra note 14, at 5-9 (describing the process); Maris, supra note 14,

at 775-76.
16 After the promulgation of a controversial set of proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972, Congress passed legislation providing that those proposed rules would
have no effect unless expressly approved by Congress. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (providing that the proposed Evidence Rules, and the amendments to the Civil and Criminal Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court in November and December 1972, "shall have no force or effect except to the extent, and with
such amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act of Congress"). Ultimately, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in a statute that made substantive changes to some proposed Rules and stylistic changes to others. See Act of Jan. 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence). The resulting legislation altered the enabling statute as well as the proposed
rules themselves. In a new enabling provision governing future amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress set a 180-day report-and-wait period; purported to
empower either house of Congress, acting alone, to block proposed amendments; and
provided that any amendment "creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall
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1980s, the rulemaking process had come under increasing fire. Critics focused variously on a number of perceived problems, including
an absence of sufficient public input, 7 a lack of representativeness on
the relevant committees," a failure by the rulemakers to observe the
limits of their power,' 9 the Court's lack of suitability as promulgator of
the Rules, ° and difficulties with congressional review.2' In 1988, Congress responded to these and similar criticisms by amending the Enabling Act. The 1988 amendments, which gave the Act its present
structure,22 codified the roles of the Standing and Advisory Commit-

have no force or effect unless it shall be approved by act of Congress." Id., 88 Stat. at
1948. (The "one-house veto" provision would be repealed in 1988. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 401(c), 102 Stat.
4642, 4650 (1988) (repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2076).)
The 1975 legislation did not modify the Enabling Act as it applied to the promulgation of the Civil Rules, but in the years that followed, Congress would take a more
active role in the revision of those Rules as well. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 3, at 1053
(noting "a new willingness on the part of Congress to become involved in the rulemaking process in particular instances").
Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61
A.B.A.J. 579, 579 (1975).
1 Id. at 579.
See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1195 (suggesting that "the Judicial Conference
should consider the formulation of standards or guidelines delineating the proper
spheres of activity of its Rules Committees"); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedures,76 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 930 (1976) ("Where substantial substantive policies are at stake or fundamental jurisdictional issues are raised, the courts
should refrain from treating the matter by rules, but should.., seek appropriate legislation.").
20 See Weinstein, supra note 19, at 962 (arguing that members of the
Court lack the
requisite expertise and time to study the pertinent issues, and that the Court's involvement "inhibits the Court itself and other courts from impartially construing the
rules"). Howard Lesnick also noted the "excessive centralization of authority" in the
Chief Justice, who appointed the members of the Advisory and Standing Committees,
chaired the Judicial Conference, and presided over the Supreme Court deliberations
concerning proposed rules. Lesnick, supra note 17, at 579, 581.
21 See Lesnick, supra note 17, at 583 (arguing that a
"workable mode of genuine
congressional review needs to be devised"); Weinstein, supra note 19, at 930 (suggesting guidelines for congressional review of proposed rules to increase "[t]he effectiveness of the rulemaking mechanism under [the] delegation system").
2 In 1990, Congress added a provision to the Rules Enabling Act authorizing the
promulgation of rules to "define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under [28 U.S.C. § 1291]." Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (1990). In 1992, Congress added a provision
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 authorizing the promulgation, under the Enabling Act, of rules for

interlocutory appeals not otherwise provided for in § 1292. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 4506, 4506 (1992) (adding
new subsection 1292(e) that authorizes the Supreme Court to "prescribe rules, in accordance with [28 U.S.C. §] 2072 ... to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under [§ 1292] (a),

2002]

THE PARADOX OFDELEGATION

1109

tees. Thus, the Enabling Act now requires the Judicial Conference to
authorize the appointment of a Standing Committee, and the Act explicitly empowers the Judicial Conference to authorize the appoint23
ment of Advisory Committees.
The present statutory structure, then-unlike the original Enabling Act-contemplates that any proposed amendment will be approved by four separate bodies (the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court)
before being reported to Congress. A similar trend is evident in other
aspects of the process.
C. Representation
As noted above, one criticism of the pre-1988 rulemaking process
was that it was unrepresentative. Although the 1988 amendments may
not have gone as far as they could have to address this concern, the
current statutory framework-in contrast to the original Enabling
Act 2'4-does require the involvement of selected practitioners and trial
and appellate judges. The Judicial Conference, which since 1958 has
been tasked with recommending proposed amendments to the Court,
comprises the chief judges of each circuit court of appeals, a district
judge chosen by the circuit and district judges of each circuit, and the

(b), (c), or (d)"). Those amendments, however, did not alter the rulemaking structure.
23 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (2), (b) (1994).
Although a previous proposal would have
the Rules, the 1988 Act leaves that
promulgate
to
Conference
Judicial
the
empowered
authority with the Supreme Court. H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 20 (1985).
24 As noted above, the Enabling Act of 1934 did not require the Supreme Court to
consult any other body prior to submitting proposed Rules to Congress. Although the
Court generally delegated the drafting work to the Advisory Committee-thus giving a
number of prominent practitioners and academics significant input into the rulemaking process-few lower court judges played a formal role. TheJudicial Conference on
occasion provided the Court with feedback on rulemaking issues, see, e.g., CHARLES E.
HUGHES, REPORT OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON (Sept. 28, 1937) (reporting that the Conference considered the Advisory Committee's proposed draft of
the Civil Rules and that "[v]arious questions were raised and discussed, to the end that
the Supreme Court should have the advantage of the views of the members of the Conference"), reprinted in 24 A.B.A.J. 75, 78 (1938), but it had no formal role in the process. Instead, the Court communicated directly with the Advisory Committee. See Order on the Appointment of Comm. to Draft Unified Sys. of Equity and Law Rules, 295
U.S. 774, 775 (1935) ("The Advisory Committee shall at all times be directly responsible to the Court."); see also Clark, FederalRules, supra note 11, at 439-40 (noting that for
approximately the first two decades of its existence, the Advisory Committee's office
was located in the Supreme Court's own building).
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chief judge of the Court of International Trade. 5 In 1988, moreover,
Congress-seeking to "provide[] for greater participation by all segments of the bench and
-""-specified
that any Advisory Committees created under the Enabling Act "shall consist of members of the
bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges."" Although the Enabling Act does not require the creation of Advisory
Committees, in practice there has long been an Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, and the Act's directive concerning Advisory Committee
composition thus ensures that at least some practitioners, as well as a
number ofjudges, will be involved in the rulemaking process. Moreover, the public notice-and-comment period-which is discussed below-provides an additional opportunity for practitioners and other
members of the public to voice their views of a proposed amendment.
D. Public Access and Input
The 1988 Act responded to a perception of "a lack of openness,
and, in part as a consequence, the perception of overreaching by the
rulemakers"; 2s accordingly, the Enabling Act, as amended in 1988, includes a number of provisions designed to further a notice-andcomment rulemaking process.29
The drafters of the 1988 legislation-seeking to "parallel the
openness requirements of the House and Senate committees and subcommittees"-made the rulemakers' activities more accessible to the
public. 30 The Judicial Conference must publish its procedures for the
consideration of proposed amendments."' The meetings of the Advisory and Standing Committees are (with limited exceptions) open to
the public, and sufficient notice must be given of each meeting to en-

2
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). The districtjudges serve for terms of three
to five years.
Id. The membership of the Judicial Conference in 1958 was similar, except that it included the chiefjudge of the Court of Claims rather than the chiefjudge of the Court
of International Trade. Maris, supra note 14, at 774.
26 H.R. REP. No. 99-422,
at 4.
27 Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. IV, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642, 4649 (codified
at 28 U.S.C.

§ 2073(a) (2) (1994)).
28 H.R. REp. No. 99-422, at 16; see also H.R. REP.
No. 100-889, at 26 (1988) (noting
that H.R. REP. No. 99-422 "applies to the provisions of title I [concerning the Rules
Enabling Act], except as noted below").
29A number of these measures had already been implemented,
to varying degrees, in the procedures published by the Judicial Conference in 1983. 98 F.R.D. 389

(1983).

30 H.R. REP. No. 99-422,
at 25.
31

28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (1994).
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32

Minutes of the meetings must
able interested persons to attend.
available to the public. And
made
be
exceptions)
limited
(again with
in making recommendations, the Advisory Committee and Standing
Committee must "provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on
the body's action, including
the rule, and a written report explaining
' '4
3
views.
separate
other
or
any minority
Similarly, the process is designed to make the public aware of
proposed amendments. Proposals are circulated to the public for
comment, and currently "[m]ore than 10,000 persons and organizations are on the mailing list. ,3 Interested persons may submit written36
suggestions and may testify at public hearings on the proposals.
"[T]o the extent feasible," the rulemakers acknowledge all written
suggestions and advise each person who makes a suggestion of the
37
Advisory Committee's action thereon. Admittedly, noncontroversial
proposals often attract little attention from practitioners or other
members of the public. More contested issues, however, have drawn a
wide range of input. The Advisory Committee's 1990 call for comments on Rule 11, for example, elicited written responses from "[w] ell
After receiving public
over a hundred groups and individuals."3
Rule, the Advisory
the
to
comments on its proposed amendments
Committee responded by making a number of changes to both the

32 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1)-(2); see H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 25 ("[T]here is a strong
presumption that when conducting the quasi-legislative activities authorized by this act
that such meetings occur in the open.").
33 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1) (1994).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1994).
35 Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Federal Rulemaking: The Rulemaking Process-A Summary for the Bench and Bar, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last
visitedJan. 11, 2002).
36 Id.
37 Proceduresfor the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of
Practice and Procedure [hereinafter Judicial Conference Procedures], reprinted in 195 F.R.D.
386, 386-87 (2000). Although this is not a statutory requirement, the Judicial Conference rules in effect during the drafting and consideration of the 1988 amendments
included a similar provision, see Rules Enabling Act of 1985: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciay on HR.
2633 and H.9 3550, 99th Cong. 85, 87 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing] (reprinting Standing Committee procedures), and this requirement was noted in the House report on
the bill that would form the basis of the amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 10.
38 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIL RULES, COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., INTERIM REPORT ON RULE 11,
at 1 [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], reprinted in GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11
SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES, app. I, at 1-3 (2d ed.
1991).
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text and the Notes.3
E.

The Advisory Committee Notes

From the outset, the Advisory Committee followed a practice of
providing an explanatory Note when it forwarded a proposed new
Rule or amendment for approval. Over the years, the Notes have increased in significance, and they now play an integral role in the
rulemaking process.
The Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied the original
Rules were often terse, and the Advisory Committee itself apparently
did not intend that they be given binding effect. 40 The length of the
Notes increased markedly by the 1960s, however, and the Notes now
contain a significant amount of explanatory information. A survey of
Notes to amendments promulgated since 1988 shows that the Advisory
Committee
currently uses the Notes 42to indicate an amendment's pur41
pose, guide future interpretations, discuss the amendment's rela.

39 See Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, attachment B (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523-25 (1993)
(noting a number of criticisms made during the public comment period and detailing
some changes Advisory Committee had made, in response, to the text and Notes of the
proposed amendments).
As the Advisory Committee's introductory statement put it, "'The notes are not
part of the rules, and the Supreme Court has not approved or otherwise assumed responsibility for them. They have no official sanction, and can have no controlling
weight with the courts, when applying the rules in litigated cases."' Henry P. Chandler,
Some Major Advances in the FederalJudicial System, 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 503 (1963)
(quoting 3A WILLIAM W. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (1958) (quoting the introductory statement)).
41 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 4 advisory committee's
note (1993) ("The general purpose of this revision is to facilitate the service of the summons and complaint."); FED.
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993) ("A major purpose of the revision [to
Rule 26(a)] is to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case .... ");
id. 2000 advisory committee's note (stating that the amendments "restore national uniformity to disclosure practice [and] to other aspects of discovery"); FED. R. Civ. P. 30
advisory committee's note (1993) (explaining that the aims of new Rule 30(a) (2) (A)
are to assure judicial review before any side takes more than ten depositions without
consent of other parties and "to emphasize that counsel have a professional obligation
to develop a mutual cost-effective plan for discovery"); FED. R. Civ. P. 33 advisory
committee's note (1993) ("The purpose of this revision is to reduce the frequency and
increase the efficiency of interrogatory practice."); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee's note (1991) (listing five purposes for the amendment); FED. R. CIV. P. 53 advisory
committee's note (1991) ("The purpose of the revision is to expedite proceedings before a master."); FED. R. CIv. P. 77 advisory committee's note (1991) ("The purpose of
the revisions is to permit district courts to ease strict sanctions now imposed on appellants whose notices of appeal are filed late because of their failure to receive notice of
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F. The Report-and-Wait Requirement
The final significant aspect of the rulemaking process, for present
purposes, is the requirement that each proposed amendment be reported to Congress, so that Congress has an opportunity to enact legislation preventing the amendment from taking effect. The reportand-wait period-which since 1950 had been only ninety days for the
Civil Rules-more than doubled in 1988, so that Congress now has at
54
It is
least seven months in which to review proposed amendments.
nonemay
amendments
proposed
that
experience
past
evident from
theless survive the waiting period, despite substantial congressional
opposition; but the report-and-wait feature is important because it requires that both the text of a proposed Rule and its Note be set before
Congress prior to taking effect.
Admittedly, Congress has interfered only sporadically in the rulemaking process,55 and congressional inertia has foiled several attempts
member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the members and Reporters-as
well as members of the public commenting on possible changes--devoted considerable attention to the explanatory notes as well as to the text of proposed rules.").
54 The statute provides
that:
The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May I of the
year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a
copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December I of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.
28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994).
155The most dramatic congressional intervention came in the early 1970s, in response to the proposed Rules of Evidence. Critics of the proposed evidence rules argued that some of the rules were outside the scope of the Enabling Act delegation, and
that other rules were ill-advised as a policy matter. The debate convinced Congress
that it "could not properly dispose of the matter before the July 1, 1973 deadline," 120
CONG. REc. H40,890 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate), and in
March 1973 a law was passed providing that the rules had "no force or effect except to
the extent, and with such amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act of
Congress." Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. Ultimately-more than
a year and a half later-the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted by Congress, in a
statute that made substantive changes to some proposed Rules and stylistic changes to
others. SeeAct of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting Federal Rules of Evidence). Subsequently, "Congress went on to examine at length, and
make major and detailed revisions in, criminal rules submitted in 1974 and habeas
corpus amendments submitted in 1976." BROWN, supranote 14, at 3; see also id. at 33 &
n.76 (stating that "Congress may defer all or part of the promulgated rules, and after
deferral, it may approve, amend, or reject them," and describing congressional action
after deferral of two sets of rules in the 1970s). Similarly, in 1982 Congress delayed the
effective date of proposed amendments to Rule 4, see Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-227, 96 Stat. 246, and ultimately made a number of adjustments to the amendments
before enacting them by legislation, see Act ofJan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97462, 96 Stat.
2527 (enacting amendments to Rule 4); see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.

1116

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 150:1099

to delay or alter proposed Rules. For example, though the initial set
of Rules prompted hearings in both houses of Congress and aroused
significant resistance in the Senate, no legislation resulted." A commentator surmised that
[p]erhaps one of the reasons that the opponents of the rules in the Senate did not press the issue to a vote was that concurrent action of both
houses of Congress would have been necessary to prevent them from becoming effective. Delaying action of the Senate only would have been
futile. 57
There was no prospect of such action in the House of Representatives.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1001, at 8-9 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the
1983 amendments to Rule 4); David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (eff Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions,96 F.R.D. 88,
94-97 (discussing the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 and noting instances where the
amendments as enacted by Congress differed from the amendments as promulgated
by the Supreme Court).
At other times, the passage of legislation on a substantive topic has led Congress to
modify the rules of procedure as well. Thus, the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 altered the application of Rule 11 in certain securities cases, see 15 U.S.C. §
77z-1 (c) (Supp. 111996) (directing the court, at the conclusion of private action under
the Securities Act of 1933, to make certain findings concerning compliance with Rule
11 (b); in the event that those findings disclose a violation of Rule 11 (b), removing
court's discretion not to impose sanctions for the violation; and creating a presumption that the appropriate sanction for substantial failure of complaint to comply with
Rule 11 (b) is an award to defendant of the reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses
incurred in the action); id. § 78u-4(c) (Supp. 11 1996) (imposing similar requirements
in private actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), heightened the pleading requirements in securities fraud cases, see id. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. 111996) (requiring,
inter alia, that the complaint "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind"), required special certifications by proposed representatives of plaintiff classes, see id. § 77z-1 (a) (2) (A) (Supp.
II 1996) (imposing certification requirement in class actions under Securities Act of
1933); id. § 78u-4(a)(2) (A) (Supp. I 1996) (imposing certification requirement in
class actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and provided for the appointment of a lead plaintiff, see id. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (Supp. 11 1996) (providing for appointment of lead plaintiff in class actions under the Securities Act of 1933); id. § 78u4(a) (3) (Supp. 11 1996) (providing for appointment of a lead plaintiff in class actions
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
On occasion, Congress has amended a Rule in order to conform it to newly enacted legislation. See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 205, 94
Stat. 2325, 2330 (1980) (repealing FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f)).
SeeChandler, supra note 40, at 506-12 (describing reactions to
the initial set of
Rules in the House and Senate).
57 Id. at 511; see also Friedenthal, supra note 11, at
674 (finding it "doubtful that
these alterations in federal procedure could have been made by Congress in the face
of opposition from trial attorneys"). Although the vote to which Chandler referred
concerned a resolution to postpone the Rules' effective date, rather than to disapprove
them outright, the postponement effort apparently was spearheaded by opponents of
the Rules as promulgated. See Chandler, supra note 40, at 509 (describing Senator Wil-
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43
lion to surrounding law, and provide practice tips for lawyers and
44
the
Of particular significance to the present discussion,
judges.
45

rulemaking process itself.
Notes are designed to inform the

The Enabling Act, as amended in 1988, requires each body that
proposes or forwards an amendment to include an "explanatory note"
46
with each proposed Rule. Thus, the Advisory Committee Reporter's
first draft of a proposed amendment includes "'Committee Notes' ex47
plaining [the amendment's] purpose and intent." After the Advisory
Committee meets to consider and revise "the draft proposed new rules
4
and rules amendments, together with Committee Notes, " both text

entry of ajudgment.").
(a) (1)
42 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee's note (1991) ("Paragraph
articulates the standard for the granting of a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
It effects no change in the existing standard."); FED. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory committee's
note (1993) (reaffirming that "the 1991 revision ...was not intended to change the
existing standards under which 'directed verdicts' could be granted").
43 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) (discussing the
Rule's relationship to courts' inherent powers); FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's
note (1993) (same); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory committee's note (2000) (same).
44 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's note (1993) ("If electronic means
for
such as facsimile transmission are employed [in sending the notice and request
waiver of service of summons under Rule 4(d)], the sender should maintain a record
");FED. R.
of the transmission to assure proof of transmission if receipt is denied ....
and
parties
factors
of
variety
a
Civ. P. 30 advisory committee's note (2000) (suggesting
deposia
for
time
the
extending
considering
when
account
into
courts should take
to
tion); FED. R. CIv. P. 37 advisory committee's note (1993) ("If the party required
more
the
contentions,
own
its
support
to
material
the
need
would
make the disclosure
effective enforcement of the disclosure requirement will be to exclude the evidence
most
not disclosed ....); FED. R. Civ. P. 43 advisory committee's note (1996) ("The
to arise
persuasive showings of good cause and compelling circumstances are likely
or
when a witness is unable to attend trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident
illness, but remains able to testify from a different place."); FED. R. Civ. P. 48 advisory
circumcommittee's note (1991) ("[T]he parties should not other than in exceptional
constistances be encouraged to waive the right to ajury of six, not only because of the
less
and
erratic
more
are
juries
smaller
because
also
but
right,
tutional stature of the
FED.
effective in serving to distribute responsibility for the exercise ofjudicial power.");
outR. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee's note (1995) ("Furnishing litigants with a copy
case for
lining the judge's practices-or attaching instructions to a notice setting a
conference or trial-would suffice to give actual notice ....).
45 One Note includes a comment designed specifically to flag issues for consideration during the rulemaking process itself. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's
note (1993) ("Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling Act, the Committee
(k) (2)."),
calls the attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to new subdivision
guidance
provide
Notes
the
generally,
More
(1993).
557-58
557,
F.R.D.
reprinted in 146
process, as well as to subsequent interpreters.
to participants in the rulemaking
46 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1994).
47Judicial Conference Procedures,supra note 37, at 387.
48 Id.; see also, e.g.,
Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Draft Minutes, Apr. 23-24,
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and Notes are submitted for approval of publication; 41)and the proposals circulated for public comment accordingly include Notes as
well as text. Likewise, when the Advisory Committee meets to decide
whether to submit the proposed Rules and their Notes to the Standing
S 50
Committee for adoption, it considers, and may revise, both text and
Notes.5 The Standing Committee, similarly, may change the relevant
Note before approving a proposed Rule and forwarding it to the Judicial Conference . The Notes, as well as the text, of proposed Rules
amendments are forwarded to the Judicial Conference and, in turn, to
the Supreme Court and then to Congress.
Thus, the Enabling Act now requires that each proposed amendment be accompanied-throughout the approval process-by an Advisory Committee Note; and these Notes are drafted, redrafted, voted
on, and approved in much the same manner as the text of the proposed Rules.

2001, at 43 [hereinafter Draft Minutes] (noting Advisory Committee decision to add
language to Note accompanying proposed Rule 53, and stating that "[w]ith this
chanwe in the Note, subdivision [53] (i) was approved").
JudicialConference Procedures,supra note 37, at 387-88.
50 See id. at 389-90 ("The Advisory
Committee shall submit proposed rules changes
and Committee notes, as finally agreed upon, to the Standing Committee.").
51 See, e.g.,
Draft Minutes, supra note 48, at 6 ("it was agreed that
a reminder of this
requirement should be added to the Committee Note ....With this addition, Rule
58(a) (1) was approved for submission to the Standing Committee for adoption.").
52 The 1980 amendments to Rule
37 provide an illustration. The Advisory Committee's proposed amendments to Rule 37 included the addition of a new subsection
(h) that would have permitted the district court, when appropriate, to "notify the Attorney General of the United States and other appropriate heads of offices or agencies
thereof in writing, that the United States, through its officers or attorneys, has failed to
participate in good faith in discovery." STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES, CHAIRMAN, AND THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, in 85 F.R.D. 536, 536 (1980) (quoting Advisory Committee proposal). Based

on its belief that district courts "already ha[d]" such authority, the Standing Committee rejected the proposed Rule 37(h). Id. at 537. Instead, "with the concurrence" of
the Chair of the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee added a paragraph to
the Notes noting such authority. Id.
Admittedly, changes made by the Standing Committee may be problematic if the
Committee fails to make all the revisions necessary to conform the Note to the revised
proposal. For example, Stephen Burbank has noted that when the Standing Committee recommended in the fall of 1992 that the Judicial Conference approve an alternative version of a proposed amendment to Rule 4, "the rulemakers failed to clean up" a
relevant paragraph of the Note to reflect the changes made by the Standing Committee. Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making ProceduralLaw for International
CivilLitigation,57 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at 103, 117 n.120.
53 See Thomas D. Rowe,Jr., A Square Peg
in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the
Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 13, 29 (2001) ("In my experience as a
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Similarly, the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 took effect-despite
congressional opposition-on August 1, 1983. On July 26, the House
had passed a bill that would have deferred the effective date for four
months.5 s However, when the bill was transmitted to the Senate, that
body unanimously ordered it "held at the desk until the close of business" on July 29. 59 As the Reporter to the Advisory Committee later
recalled, "[i] t was one of those death-defying cliff-hangers because a
bill to delay [the amendments'] effectiveness was sitting in the well of
60
one hauled it out."
the Senate on the appropriate morning, but no
Instead, on Friday, July 29, the Senate referred the bill to the Judiciary
Committee6 -which, as the amendments were to take effect the fol62
Aclowing Monday, "doomed the effort to delay the effective date.
beof
think
can
you
hair
thinnest
cordingly, the amendments "by the
"
came effective on August 1, 1983. 63 The 1993 amendments to Rules
11 and 26, likewise, sparked debate in Congress, but Congress again
failed to act. After subcommittees of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held hearings on the proposed amendments in June and
July 1993, respectively, 64 bills were introduced in both houses to delay

liam H. King's introduction of a joint resolution delaying the effective date of the
Rules and predicting numerous questions concerning the extent to which the Rules
would conflict with and supersede existing federal law); id. at 511 (stating that
"[b]esides Senator King, a number of Senators, including leaders like Connally of
Texas, Minton of Indiana, and Norris of Nebraska viewed the rules with disfavor").
58 See 129 CONG. REC. 20,857 (1983) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (explaining that
the bill would defer the effective date of the amendments until December 1 "so as to
provide Congress with the time it needs to examine these proposals"); id. at 20,859
(noting that the bill was passed by the House).
59 129 CONG. REc. 20,818 (1983). The record actually states that the bill was to be
"held at the desk until the close of business on Monday July 29, 1983," id., leaving an
ambiguity as to whether the intended date was Friday, July 29, or Monday, August 1; in
any event, as noted below, the Senate referred the bill to the Judiciary Committee on
the 29th.
60 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER
CIVIL PROCEDURE:
RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1984), quoted in Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American
CivilProcedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1948 n.119 (1989).
61 See 129 CONG. REC. 21,618 (1983) ("The following bill ... w[as] read the first

and second times by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated: H.R. 3497. A bill
to defer proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.").
62 Burbank, supra note 60, at 1948
n.119.
63 MILLER, supra note 60, at 1, quoted in Burbank, supra note 60, at 1948 n.119.
64 See 139 CONG. REC. D664, D666 (daily ed. June 16, 1993) (noting that the
House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration held oversight hearing on amendments to the Federal Rules); 139 CONG. REC. D860, D863
(daily ed. July 28, 1993) (noting that the Senate Subcommittee on Courts and Admin-
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the effective date of the proposed amendments to Rule 11.15 The bills
were referred to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees," and
never reached the floor of either house. The House did pass a separate bill to delete certain controversial amendments to the discovery
rules, 7 but that bill, too, never reached the Senate floor, and accordingly the amendments took effect."9
As these events illustrate, amendments sometimes may survive
congressional review for reasons unrelated to their merits. Congress
might be busy with more urgent matters, it might be unable to reach
consensus, or it might simply run out of time. On the other hand, it is
also possible that some amendments fail to provoke contrary legislation because-even if some legislators oppose the amendments-a

istrative Practice held hearings on proposed amendments to Federal Rules as well as
other matters). During the House subcommittee hearing, "[c]onsiderable attention
was iven to the proposed Rule 11 changes." H.R. REP. No. 103-319 (1993).
See 139 CONG. REC. H6377, H6380 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (H.R. 2979);
139
CONG. REc. S10565, at S10566 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1993) (S. 1382).
66 139 CONG. REc. H6377, H6380 (daily
ed. Aug. 6, 1993); 139 CONG. REC.
S10,565, at S10566 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1993).
67 See 139 CONG. REC. H8744, H8745, H8747 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993)
(noting passage by the House of H.R. 2814, which would strike proposed Rule 26(a)(1)-concerning initial disclosures-and make other changes to proposed Rules 26 and 30).
Representative Hughes, the co-sponsor of the House bill concerning the discovery rules, described the bill's fate in the Senate as follows:
Subsequent to the House passage of H.R. 2814 on November 3, 1993, the
Senate informally began to consider the House-passed bill under a procedure
which placed it directly on the Senate calendar without further Senate Judiciary Committee action.
Reportedly, plaintiffs and civil rights organizations began at this late date to
encourage the Senate to amend H.R. 2814 by adding a provision that would
cancel the presumptive limits on depositions and interrogatories in the proposed rules.
As the first session of the Congress came close to its conclusion, attempts to
negotiate a compromise failed. This even included a proposal to defer several
of the controversial rules for six months.
On one hand certain Senators wanted to expand or abolish the presumptive
limits. Others wanted a vote on Senator Brown's amendment to delay the implementation of Rule 11 changes for a year. The plaintiffs' bar and civil rights
groups were adamantly opposed to delaying the Rule 11 changes.
William J. Hughes, CongressionalReaction to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 1, 10-11 (1993) (citations omitted).
69 See Michael J. Wagner, Too Much, Too Costly, Too Soon? The Automatic
Disclosure
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 468, 470 (1994)
("With the Senators unable to reach an agreement on the amendments, the bill was
not cleared for floor action, and the amended rules went into effect by default on December 1. Both lawyers and judges were surprised that the amendments became law
through congressional inaction.").
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sufficient number find the proposals unobjectionable. In such instances, the legislators who vote against the blocking legislation may
do so based on their understanding of the pertinent Advisory Committee Note, as well as the proposed Rule's text. As required by the
Enabling Act, text and Notes are transmitted to Congress together,
and a legislator (or congressional aide) seeking to understand an
amendment's effect may well read-and rely on-both. Since 1934,
then, the rulemaking structure has evolved to include more decision
makers, to provide for the representation of persons other than the
Justices of the Supreme Court, to facilitate public notice and comment, to provide Notes that accompany the text throughout the drafting and approval process, and to lengthen the opportunity for congressional review. None of these changes came about as a matter of
grace on the part of the Supreme Court; rather, they were imposed by
Congress through changes to the enabling legislation. In the Parts
that follow, I argue that these statutory requirements, and the practices under them, have significant implications for the interpretation
of the Rules.
II.

DELEGATION AND DISCRETION

As noted above, prior commentators have posited that the Enabling Act increases the Supreme Court's interpretive discretion "bev
cause the Court is promulgator as well as interpreter" of the Rules.
Judge Moore, for example, contends that "[g]iven [the] substantial,
although largely unexercised, powers of the Court in the promulgation process, a more activist role in the interpretative stage, one that
considers purpose and policy, is appropriate."7 As Part III will discuss,
some lower courts have similarly felt free to strain the Rules' text, and
ignore relevant Notes, in order to implement their own views of desirable policy. I argue that such an approach enlarges the powers of the

70

Moore, supra note 3, at 1095. Aside from the other difficulties with this view, it

fails to take account of the fact that the Court that interprets a given Rule will not necessarily be the same Court that promulgated it.
71 Moore, supra note 3, at 1093. Similarly, Bauer argues that:
In construing the Federal Rules, the courts are interpreting standards which
the Supreme Court itself has promulgated. Therefore, some of the problems
which occur during statutory interpretation, such as ferreting out legislative
intent, deferring to another branch of the government, or avoiding violations
of principles of federalism by deferring to state interests, are in large measure
eliminated.
Bauer, supra note 3, at 720.
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courts beyond their proper boundaries.
The structure of the Enabling Act delegation and the reality of the rulemaking process together suggest that courts should have, if anything, less latitude to interpret the Rules than they do to interpret statutes. This Part explains
why the principles to be drawn from the Enabling Act's structure and
function foreclose Moore's argument. The issue, however, cannot be
settled by abstract principles alone. Rather, to see the practical implications of Moore's approach, it is necessary to examine a concrete
case in some detail. To define the terms of the argument, I first take,
as an example, the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 11 in
73
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group.
Rule 11, as amended in 1983, required that every litigation paper
filed on behalf of a represented party "be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name"; similarly, pro se litigants were
required to sign their litigation papers. 74 The Rule further provided:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation.

Much of the argument that follows focuses on the Supreme Court
rather than
on lower federal courts. In part, this is because a number ofJudge Moore's arguments
relate to the Supreme Court in particular. (For instance, Moore's contention that the
Rules Enabling Act delegation provides a license for dynamic interpretation of the
Rules applies most strongly to the Supreme Court, since that Court is the body authorized to transmit proposed rules to Congress.) Likewise, some parts of my analysis focus
specifically on the Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying notes 112-121 (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in the rulemaking process); infra text accompanying
notes 152-155 (same); see also infra Part II.C (discussing potential disadvantages of policymaking by the Supreme Court). Other parts of my argument, however, apply with
equal force to interpretation by lower federal courts, see, e.g., infra text accompanying
notes 145-150 (discussing the inapplicability of the statutory obsolescence argument to
the rulemaking context), and I contend that lower courts also should adopt my suggested interpretive approach. Accordingly, I illustrate my discussion in Part III by describing the consequences that attended the Seventh Circuit's use of a contrary
method. See infra text accompanying notes 180-210 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
disregard of Rule 1I's text and Note).
. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
74 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). In 1987, Rule 11 was amended
to make its language
gender neutral. 113 F.R.D. 189, 280-81 (1987). This alteration did not, however, affect the questions at issue in Pavelic.
75 FED. R. CIv. P. 11
(1983).
72
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For violations of this certification provision, the Rule dictated that
the court "shall impose upon the person who signed [the paper], a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction."76
Although the text of the 1983 Rule thus appeared to authorize
sanctions only against the signing attorney or the client, two lower
courts held in Pavelic that the Rule also authorized sanctions against
the offending attorney's law firm." The attorney in question had
signed his court papers:
Pavelic & LeFlore
By /s/ Ray L. LeFlore
(A Member of the Firm)
Attorneys for Plaintiflf
The district court, reasoning that " [t]he law firm is the attorney of
record, and it is the law firm on whose behalf the papers are signed,"
imposed a $50,000 sanction on the attorney and his firm, jointly and
severally. 9 In the district court's view, " [o]nly if the partnership as a
whole is held responsible for the acts of its attorneys will the potential
of the rule in curbing abuses be fully recognized." 80 The Second Circuit agreed, holding that the deterrent purposes of the 1983 amendments were best served by a presumption that the law firm, as well as
the individual attorney, should be subject to sanctions." One commentator, citing the "school of thought that says the court has much
greater latitude in interpreting its own rules, even though it delegates
the drafting work to advisory committees," predicted that the Court
would likewise resolve the issue based on policy considerations."'
When the Supreme Court reversed, however, the core of its argument was that the Rule's text provided no authority for courts to sanction law firms and that the Court's "task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it."83 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, conceded that

76

Id.

77

Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 122.

78 Id.

79 Calloway v. Marvel Entm't Group, 650 F. Supp. 684, 686, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1986),
affd in part and revd in part, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in part sub nom. Pavelic
& LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
80

Id. at 687.

81

Calloway v. Marvel Entm't Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1479-80 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd in

part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
82 Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Ponders Sanctions: Rule 11: Guilt by Partnership?,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 3 (quoting Gregory P. Joseph).
83

Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 126.
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84
"viewed in isolation, the phrase 'person who signed' is ambiguous,
but maintained that Rule 11, read as a whole, settled the question:
"[I] n a paragraph beginning with a requirement of individual signature, and then proceeding to discuss the import and consequences of
signature, we think references to the signer in the later portions must
reasonably be thought to connote the individual signer mentioned at
the outset." "' The Court placed weight on the Rule's requirement that
documents be signed "in the attorney's individual name": "Where the
text establishes a duty that cannot be delegated [i.e., certification
through signature], one may reasonably expect it to authorize punishment only of the party upon whom the duty is placed. '' 1 6 Finally,
the Court rejected the lower courts' policy-based arguments, reasoning that "holding a law firm accountable for its attorney's violation"
would not necessarily further the Rule's aim of "bring[ing] home to
87
the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility."
Pavelic is a good example of the importance of adhering to the
text and Notes of a Rule. Read together, the Rule's three references
to signature (with respect to the requirement of signing, the significance of signing, and the sanctions for violations of the signing requirement) indicate that the Rule contemplated sanctions only
against parties and signing attorneys, not law firms. Moreover, the accompanying Note discussed the signing attorney's liability without giving any suggestion that the Rule was thought to extend to the signer's
firm."" Indeed, had the 1983 amendments authorized sanctions
against law firms, such a feature would have merited scrutiny during
the rulemaking process. In Pavelic itself, the target of the court's
$50,000 sanction was a two-man firm, which included the signer of the
papers and a partner who appears to have been mainly a transactional
lawyer.89 Although Pavelic, the transactional partner, observed several

84
85

Id. at 123.
Id. at 124.

86;Id. at 125.
87 Id. at 126. In dissent, Justice Marshall
offered a purposive interpretation similar
to those relied upon by the lower courts; he argued that "[o]ne of the fundamental
purposes of Rule 11 is to strengthen the hand of the trial judge in his efforts to police
abusive litigation practices." Id. at 127 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
88 Thus, for example, the Note emphasized that the
1983 amendments placed responsibility on "anyone who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper" and explained
that the amendments were designed to make clear the court's discretion "to impose
sanctions on either the attorney, the party the signing attorney represents, or both."
FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
Pavelic's practice area is currently listed in the West Legal
Directory database as
"Estate Planning."
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days of depositions and trial in the case and was active in retaining a
special counsel for the trial, 0 there is no indication that he would
have had the opportunity to monitor effectively the offending papers.
Nor would it have been appropriate for the district court to attempt to
determine whether Pavelic had had such an opportunity; the Advisory
Committee Note cautioned that "[t]o assure that the efficiencies
achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen
will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition
of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of
sanction proceedings to the record,""" and that record would be most
unlikely to provide information sufficient to determine the lines of responsibility within a firm.
This is not to say that there were no policy arguments to be made
for a Rule that extended sanctions to the signer's law firm. Indeed, in
1993 the rulemakers amended Rule 11 to do just that. However, while
Rule 11 now includes an offending attorney's law firm among those
who can be sanctioned, 92 this expansion is balanced by a new provision
granting a "safe harbor" of twenty-one days (after service of a Rule 11
motion) within which the offending item can be "withdrawn or appropriately corrected"O3-a period during which, the Note suggests,
filing of the motion.9
the law firm can take measures to avoid the
Even had it been otherwise appropriate for the Pavelic Court to extend
Rule 11 to law firms, the Court presumably could not have offset that
extension with the sort of safe harbor created by the rulemakers.
To Judge Moore, however, the Pavelic Court wasted an opportu9 See Calloway, 854 F.2d at 1480 (stating that Pavelic "was no passive observer in
the... litigation," because he "'often discussed' the case with LeFlore.... he attended
several depositions and days of trial, and ...he insisted that Raymond L. Levites be
retained as special counsel for the trial").
9, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).
92 FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c) (1993). To underline the change, the Note cited Pavelic
and stated that "[t]his provision is designed to remove the restrictions of the former
rule." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993).
93 FED. R. CIrv. P. 1] (c)(1)(A) (1993).
94 See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993) ("Since such a motion
may be filed only if the offending paper is not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days
after service of the motion, it is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as
jointly responsible under established principles of agency."). In addition, the 1993
version of Rule 11 provides that in "exceptional circumstances" a law firm can be exempted from liability for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (c)(])(A) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall
be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees."). It seems possible that this exception might have protected Pavelic from being held responsible for LeFlore's violations.
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95
nity to take a "formative role... in the development of the Rules."
Specifically, Moore recognizes that policy arguments could cut either
way in Pavelic,96 but argues that "given the absence of any empirical
evidence supporting either hypothesis as to the effects of imposing
sanctions upon the firm, it should be within the trial judge's power to
impose sanctions on a law firm as well as (or instead of) the individual
attorney signer."9' Moore does not explain why the absence of empirical data would support a judicial extension of the Rule. She does,
however, make clear that her proposed approach would authorize
such an extension. Pavelic thus nicely illustrates the practical effects of
Moore's thesis that the Court should have more latitude in interpreting the Rules because it is charged with promulgating them. With this
example in hand, I now turn to the theoretical problems with that
thesis.

A.

The Rules EnablingAct's ConditionalTransfer of Power

Interpretive arguments based on the Court's rulemaking power
might take two general forms. First, Congress's delegation of rulemaking power to the judiciary might be thought to enlarge the
Court's interpretive powers. Second, to the extent that the Court possesses inherent rulemaking authority, it might be argued that such
authorityjustifies the Court in taking a more policy-oriented approach
to the interpretation of Rules promulgated pursuant to the Enabling
Act. This Section discusses each of these contentions and concludes
that neither accords with the rulemaking structure set by the Enabling
Act.
The Enabling Act unquestionably transfers lawmaking power from
Congress to the judicial branch. 98 Amendments promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking process take effect, after the report-and-wait period, unless Congress enacts legislation to the contrary. Congress's
failure to block the initial set of Rules, and its similar inaction with respect to the 1983 and 1993 amendments, illustrates that amendments

Moore, supra note 3, at 1097.
On one hand, Moore argues, limiting sanctions to the individual signer
may
help ensure individual compliance with Rule 11; on the other, allowing sanctions
against the firm may cause firms to monitor their attorneys' behavior. Moore does not
explain why the extension of sanctions to law firms would induce effective monitoring
in two-person firms comprising one litigator and one transactional lawyer.
97 Moore, supra note 3,
at 1098-99.
9 The argument that such power was already part of the Court's inherent
authority is addressed below. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
95
M
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can take effect despite significant congressional opposition." The
Rules Enabling Act thus somewhat resembles statutes that delegate
rulemaking authority to agencies: rules made by an agency have the
00
force of law unless invalidated by judicial review or nullified by legislation. There are salient differences, however. For example, although
"the transfer of lawmaking authority from Congress-with-the-President
(the Article I, Section 7 structure) to agencies significantly increases
the importance of the President's preferences in the lawmaking process" (because "agencies are influenced or even controlled by the
President"), 10 agency rulemaking claims democratic legitimacy be10 2
By concause the President is "directly accountable to the people."
to
authority
rulemaking
delegating
trast, the Rules Enabling Act-by
accountable
the judiciary-privileges the decisions of a less politically

branch.'0 3
An advocate of interpretive discretion might contend that the
Enabling Act actually removes a countermajoritarian difficulty present
in other interpretive contexts: in this view, since unelected judges
promulgate the Rules, no decrease in democratic accountability occurs
if an unelected judge contradicts a Rule's text, for policy reasons,
when interpreting a Rule. The structure established by the Enabling

99 See supra text accompanying notes 56-69 (discussing opposition to past sets of

1948
rules and noting reasons the opposition failed); see also Burbank, supra note 60, at
(noting that the 1983 amendments "only barely escaped the bright light of the democratic process"). Although the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act gave Congress
more time to consider proposed amendments, it nonetheless failed to enact legislation
notes
to block the 1993 amendments from taking effect. See supra text accompanying
64-69 (discussing the ineffectual opposition to the 1993 amendments).
10 As discussed in Part III.A below, judicial review of rulemaking under the Rules
Enabling Act has thus far proven largely meaningless.
101 William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 535 (1992).
102 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1068 (3d ed. 2001)

(1984); see also, e.g., WILLIAM N.
LEGISLATION:

(noting that "Chevron rests the idea of deference on the greater democratic legitimacy
by
that agencies enjoy over courts in making policy choices that have been left open
Congress").
0, See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, ParadiseLost, ParadigmFound: Redefining theJudiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1244 (1996) ("Agenciesthe
even so-called 'independent' agencies-are politically accountable in ways that
to
judiciary is not."); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference
("The
(1996)
n.302
675
612,
REV.
L.
COLUM.
96
Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules,
effectiveness of congressional oversight of administrative agencies is hotly contested
among political scientists... What is obvious, however, is that Congress necessarily
exercises more effective control over administrative agencies than over the judiciary.").
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Act, however, forecloses this argument.0
The 1988 amendments, in
particular, were designed to "encourage participation [in the rulemaking process] by a broad segment of the community.' 10 Accordingly, the Enabling Act requires that the public be given notice and
the opportunity to attend the meetings of the Advisory and Standing
Committees, and it mandates public access to the committee minutes.' ° 6 Proposed amendments circulate to over 10,000 individuals
and organizations; in the case of a controversial proposal, circulation
often elicits numerous comments, each of which-to the extent feasible-receives a response from the rulemakers."'7 The Advisory Committee reconsiders its proposals in the light of the public's critiques,
and if it makes substantial changes it may recirculate the proposal for
further public consideration. A court faced with an interpretive question in the context of litigation could not-even were it so inclinedprovide such extensive opportunities for public input. Similarly, if the
Court departed from the text and Notes of a Rule to serve its views of
purpose and policy-as Moore advocates-such an interpretive practice would contravene the decision-making structure set by the Enabling Act. Although the Act continues to state that
z • 108"[t]he Supreme
Court shall have the power to prescribe" the Rules, this authorization is subject to the "method of prescribing" set forth in the Act.' 9
That method-as discussed in Part I-entails a deliberative, multi104 Cf Eileen A. Scallen, Classical
Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1739-40 (1995) (notingJudge Moore's argument concerning the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and rejecting a similar argument concerning the Federal Rules of Evidence).
105 H.R. REP. No.
99-422, at 26 (1985).
106 See supra Part I.D (discussing
ways in which the 1988 amendments to the
Rules
Enabling Act foster public access and input).
107See id. (describing the process of circulation
of proposed amendments for public comment).
108 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994).
A previous proposal would have removed
this
authority. As the House Report on the bill that would form the basis for the 1988 revisions explained:
The original bill in the 98th Congress... provided that the Judicial Conference..., rather than the Supreme Court, had the authority to promulgate
the rules. This approach was thought to respond to the workload concerns of
the Court. This suggestion was initially approved by the Supreme Court. After introduction of the bill, concern about this shift in authority was expressed
by the Conference of Chief Justices, on behalf of State Supreme Courts. This
organization feared that such a move at the federal level would set an unfortunate precedent at the state level. In addition, the Supreme Court itself
eventually expressed a preference for retaining its current authority.
H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 20.
1W 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994)
(caption).
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level process ° that involves more decision makers than simply the
Supreme Court."'
The Act does, of course, give the Supreme Court the power to
veto a proposed Rule;1 2 but veto power is not a mandate for subsequent revision. As an initial matter, although the Court has on occasion exercised its authority to reject proposed Rules," 3 it has often appeared to function as a mere "conduit" from the rulemakers to
Congress." 4 Over the years, some Justices have argued that the Court
110As noted above, the Act provides for public notice and open meetings; the Act
also requires that any Advisory or Standing Committee recommendation include a
proposed rule, an explanatory note, and a "written report explaining the body's action,
including any minority or other separate views." 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1994).
II Additionally, the Act's report-and-wait requirement gives Congress an opportunity to block proposed Rules before they take effect; by contrast, no such opportunity exists when the Court reinterprets a Rule in the course of deciding a case. Cf Sara
Sun Beale, Reconsidering Superoisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutionaland Statutory
Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1479 n.282 (1984)
(noting "clear indications"-in a prior version of Rules Enabling Act-"that legislative
rulemaking is intended, such as the requirement that proposed rules be presented to
Congress well in advance of their effective date").
This power obviously distinguishes the rulemaking process from congressional
legislation. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398 n.21 (1989) ("Despite
support from Madison, the Framers rejected a proposed 'Council of Revision,' comprised of, among others, a 'convenient number of the National Judiciary,' . . . that
would have exercised veto power over proposed legislation.") (quoting 1 M. FARRAND,
THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (1911)); Manning, supra
note 103, at 643 (noting that the Constitutional Convention "repeatedly rejected proposals forjudicial participation in the veto power through a Council of Revision").
113 Thus, the Court rejected a number of proposed Rules during the first two decades under the Enabling Act. Supra note 11 and accompanying text. A more recent
example occurred in 1991, when the Court "refus[ed] to transmit proposed amendments [to Congress] because of foreign relations concerns." Stephen B. Burbank, Ignoranceand ProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfor a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 843
(1993).
114 Some Justices clearly do not fit this description, in the sense that they have
taken care to dissent from one or more proposed amendments that the Court transmitted to Congress. For example, the order promulgating the original set of Rules
noted that "Mr. Justice Brandeis states that he does not approve of the adoption of the
Rules." Order of Dec. 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783, 783 (1937). It appears that Justice
Brandeis left no writing that would explain his reasons for dissenting. Some have
speculated that they may have related to the opinion Justice Brandeis was soon to write
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 40, at
504 ("It seems probable that Justice Brandeis's reasons for dissenting] were related to
the philosophy of his decision rendered within a few months in April 1938 in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."). Stephen Burbank, after reviewing the available evidence, has argued that Justice Brandeis's dissent from the promulgation of the Rules arose, not
from constitutional objections such as those voiced in Erie, but rather from concerns
that the Rules "would unnecessarily displace state law and lead to practical difficulties
for lawyers." Letter from Professor Stephen B. Burbank, University of Pennsylvania
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is too busy to scrutinize the substance of proposed amendments.1 5
Others have claimed reliance on the judgment of the Advisory Committee."' When Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented
from the adoption of amendments to the discovery rules in 1980, they
advised Congress to "bear in mind that our approval of proposed
Rules is more a certification that they are the products of proper proLaw School, to Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, New York University School of Law 3
(Mar. 6, 1985) (on file with author).
In the years that followed, Justices Black and Douglas regularly dissented, on
grounds ranging from constitutional arguments, to Rules Enabling Act concerns, to
policy considerations, to a desire to disassociate the Court from the rulemaking process. See, e.g., Order of Dec. 28, 1939, 308 U.S. 642, 642-43 (1939) (adopting an
amendment to Rule 81 and noting thatJustice Black did not approve); Order of Apr.
17, 1961, 368 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that
Civil Rule 25(d), governing substitution of public officials as parties, should not be
amended via rulemaking because its present text was derived from a statute and the
rulemaking process was "inappropriate ...for effecting such a basic change in congressional policy as the proposed Rule 25(d) achieves"); Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374
U.S. 865, 865-66 & nn.4 & 5 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the
Enabling Act violated the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements,
and that certain proposals violated Enabling Act's terms by affecting substantive rights
and by encroaching on the right to trial by jury); Order of Feb. 28, 1966, 383 U.S.
1031, 1032-33 (1966) (Black,J., dissenting) (reiterating bicameralism and presentment
argument, and voicing policy concerns about proposed amendments); Order of Feb.
28, 1966, 383 U.S. 1089, 1090 (1966) (Douglas,J., dissenting in part) ("[S]ince under
the [enabling statute authorizing promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] the Rules go to Congress only on the initiative of the Court, I cannot be only a
conduit." (citation omitted)); Order of Apr. 24, 1972, 406 U.S. 981, 981 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (dissenting from adoption of proposed criminal rule, in part
because "t] here may be several better ways of achieving the desired result"); Order of
Apr. 28, 1975, 421 U.S. 1022, 1022 (1975) (Douglas, J.,dissenting) (dissenting from
adoption of bankruptcy rules and forms under the argument that "[b]ecause this
Court is no more than a 'rubber stamp' I think it should not participate in the rulemaking process").
No matter the care with which some dissenters may have scrutinized the amendments, however, there is no basis for ascribing their meticulousness to the majority.
1'5See, e.g., Order ofJan. 27, 1971, 400 U.S.
1031, 1036 (1971) (Black, J.,joined by
Douglas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from promulgation of Rules of Procedure for the
Trial of Minor Offenses Before United States Magistrates because "[w]ith our heavy
caseload and the most crowded docket in history there is no use pretending that such
rules can or do receive the careful, thoughtful attention of this Court"). In 1979, Chief
Justice Burger noted "valid questions as to whetherJustices can give proposed rules the
kind of close study needed, and whether the Court's approval is really meaningful."
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary: December 29, 1980, in
STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 2000).
116 For example, Justice
Frankfurter appeared to disclaim responsibility for
amendments promulgated in 1946, stating that he joined in approving the amendments "essentially because of his confidence in the informed judgment of the Advisory
Committee." Order of Dec. 27, 1946, 329 U.S. 843 (1946).
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cedures than a considered judgment on the merits of the proposals
themselves.""' Likewise, when the Court forwarded the 1993 amendments to Congress, Chief Justice Rehnquist's transmittal letter disclaimed responsibility for the substance of the amendments, stating
that "[w]hile the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have
been observed, this transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the
Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form
submitted."" 8
In any event, even if the Court did take a uniformly active role in
reviewing (and, where appropriate, rejecting) proposed Rules, such a
role would not expand the Court's power to alter a promulgated Rule.
The Enabling Act permits the Court to maintain the status quo-even
if the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, and the Judicial
Conference wish to alter it-because, if the Court rejects a proposed
amendment, only congressional legislation can override the Court's
veto. However, the Court is not the only "vetogate" in the rulemaking
process.1 Should the Court wish to alter a Rule already in force, the
Enabling Act does not contemplate that the Court could do so outside
I°
entities,
the rulemaking structure. N Though the Court, like other
2
cannot
it
1
consideration,
rulemakers'
the
can suggest changes for
Order of Apr. 29, 1980, 446 U.S. 997, 998 n.1 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by
amendments
Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters asserted that the
acceptance of
failed to implement necessary reforms, and they argued that "Congress'
rethese tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective
1000.
at
Id.
inertia."
forms" by "creat[ing] complacency and encourag[ing]
11 Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court,
(Apr. 22, 1993),
to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker, United States House of Representatives
403.
in 146 F.R.D.
"19 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
[s] in the legislative proc"stage
as
INTERPRETATION 68 (2000) (describing "vetogates"
must be formed, and
coalitions
new
halted,
or
changed
be
can
proposal
"a
ess" where
are presented"). In
deliberation
and
opportunities for logrolling, strategic behavior,
process generalize
legislative
the
of
aspects
all
not
that
conscious
I
am
using this term,
of Making Procto the context of court rulemaking. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process
GEO. L.J. 887,
87
Efficacy,
Procedural
and
Legitimacy,
Democratic
ess: Court Rulemaking,
a court-based rule924-25 (1999) (arguing that "inefficient logrolling is less likely in
covers "a
making process" because the scope of the Advisory Committee's rulemaking
smaller region over which trades can be made").
120 Admittedly, this was not always the case. In 1956, "the Court, acting on its own
46 of the Federal
and without recommendation of any committee," amended Rule
note 11, at 257.
supra
Court,
Supreme
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clark, Role of the
set the current
which
amendments,
1988
and
1958
the
preceded
This event, however,
requirements for the rulemaking process.
121 Thus, for instance, it appears that Chief Justice Burger, having "failed to perhabeas rules "via
suade his colleagues on the Court" to make certain changes to the
asking them
Committee
Advisory
the
of
case adjudication," wrote "directly to members
117
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promulgate such changes against the wishes of the other participants
in the rulemaking process.
Accordingly, since the Enabling Act conditions the delegation of
rulemaking power on the Court's use of the prescribed procedures, it
appears to require the Court to resort to those procedures when seeking to change a Rule. The matter is rendered somewhat more complex, however, by the question of the Court's inherent procedural
authority. The Supreme Court has asserted that "' [c]ertain implied
powers must necessarily result"' to the federal courts "'from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with...
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." 2 2 Advocates
ofjudicial discretion thus might argue that, to the extent the Enabling
Act's delegation merely duplicates the courts' inherent powers, courts
should have greater latitude to interpret freely the Rules promulgated
under the Act. Under this view, the Court can weigh policy considerations when exercising its inherent authority, and it should be accorded the same latitude when interpreting the Rules. This argument, however, overlooks the limits of such inherent powers.
Although the question is murky, 2 and a full treatment of the issues is
beyond the scope of this Article, 124 it is not at all clear that the federal
courts' inherent powers include authority to promulgate rules of procedure.
Rather, such inherent authority may be limited to powers
necessary to the fulfillment of the courts' Article III responsibilities-a
far narrower range than is covered by the current Federal Rules.
Moreover, the courts' inherent powers-whatever their initial extent-are subject to Congress's separate authority to regulate federal
court procedure. As the Court observed soon after the promulgation
to support" a proposal for similar changes. Letter from Nan Aron, Alliance forJustice,
Laura Macklin, Institute for Public Representation, Judith Resnik, University of Southern California Law School, Dennis E. Curtis, University of Southern California Law
School, & William Genego, University of Southern California Law School, to Robert W.
Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice 2 Uune 5, 1985), in Hearing,supra note 37, at 190, 191.
122 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting United States v.
Hudson, II U.S. 21, 23, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)).
123 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 119,
at 890 n.12 (taking "no position on the difficult
question whether courts have the constitutional power to make a system of procedural
rules in the absence of congressional authorization (or perhaps even in the face of a
contrary congressional intent)").
124 For a recent discussion of the topic,
see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers ofFederal Courts and the Structural Constitution,86 IOWA L. REv. 735 (2001).
125 See Burbank, supra note 11, at 1115
(noting that "the power of federal courts to
regulate procedure by court rules in the absence of legislative authorization ...has
not been made clear" (footnote omitted)).
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of the original Rules, "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the
practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power
by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules
not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United
States.' 26 So long as Congress's regulation of federal procedure does
27
not "prevent[] a court from discharging its Article III duties,, Congress's directives trump contrary principles adopted by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its inherent authority. Accordingly, the prior existence of inherent judicial authority concerning a particular matter
likely will be rare (given the apparent bounds of such authority) and
should, in any event, be irrelevant to the Court's interpretation of a
Rule governing the matter.
Although the Court has not claimed that inherent powers expand
its license to consult its policy inclinations when interpreting the
Rules, it might attempt a similar maneuver using a different rationale.
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Court held that neither 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 nor any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "displaces the
inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct" of a
2
The Court acknowledged that "the exercise of
party to litigation.'
the inherent power of lower federal courts can be limited by 2statute
''
and rule, for '[t] hese courts were created by act of Congress," , but it

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941)

(footnote omitted). Sibbach's
statutes is intriguing,
federal
with
inconsistent"
"not
be
rules
the
that
specification
(in its
given that the Enabling Act contained a supersession clause which provided
further
no
of
be
shall
Rules]
the
[with
conflict
in
laws
"all
that
form)
then-current
at 28
force or effect." Act of June 19, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (current version
(1994)).
2072
§
U.S.C.
in
The Enabling Act has been criticized, on the one hand, for involving the Court
TENSIONS
FEDERALJURISDICTION:
REDISH,
H.
MARTIN
"the adoption of legislation," see
(arguing
IN THE ALLOCATION OFJUDICIAL POWER 21 (2d ed., Michie Co. 1990) (1980)
for tresother,
the
on
and
powers),
of
that the Rules Enabling Act violates separation
Power
Congress'
of
Limits
Intrinsic
Engdahl,
E.
David
see
prerogatives,
judicial
on
passing
Act
Enabling
the
that
(arguing
172
75,
Regarding the JudicialBranch, 1999 BYU L. REV.
"rulecourts'
the
constrains
it
because
doubt"
constitutional
serious
to
"is subject
making competence"); cf John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules forJudiciary Procedure
legislature
Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276, 278 (1928) (asserting that "the
has
has no more constitutionalbusiness to dictate the procedure of the judiciary than the judiciary
on
proceeds
however,
discussion,
Article's
This
legislaturd').
the
of
procedure
the
to dictate
note
supra
Weinstein,
e.g.,
See,
the assumption that the Enabling Act is constitutional.
rulemak19, at 927 (noting that "Congress' position as possessor and delegator of the
ing power" is well established).
Pushaw, supra note 124, at 792 n.287.
128 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991).
129 Id. at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
126

505, 511 (1874)).
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appeared to impose a clear statement requirement on the rulemakers.
Thus, the Court will not "'lightly assume [an intent] to depart from
established principles' such as the scope of a court's inherent
power, " absent "'a much clearer expression of purpose"' showing
that the Rule "'was intended to abrogate so well-acknowledged a
proposition. '-'' 3 To the extent that such a clear statement rule functions as a one-way ratchet-providing for the application of Rules that
empower courts but mandating the narrow construction of Rules that
otherwise would limit inherent authority-it is at best an unseemly
canon of interpretation. As the Court has acknowledged, "[t]he extent of [courts' inherent] powers must be delimited with care, for
there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or.correction from the others,
undertakes to define its own authority." 132 Especially in light of the
participation of trial and appellate judges in the rulemaking process,
there is no reason to set a clear statement rule as a way to protect inherent judicial power from encroachment by the rulemakers.1

33

Just

as "[p] rinciples of deference counsel restraint in resorting to inherent
power," 134 they suggest that the Court should resist imposing a clear
statement requirement on Rules that limit inherent authority.

130 Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,

456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)).

Al-

though Weinberger concerned the interpretation of a statute, the Chambers Court's discussion elides the issues of statutory and Rules interpretation. See id. at 47-49 (concluding that neither the rulemakers' 1983 amendments to Rule 11 nor Congress's 1980
amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 removed the lower federal courts' inherent authority
to sanction litigants).
131 Id. at 49 (quoting Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631-32 (1962)).
12 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
33 It might be argued that such a clear statement rule
reflects the likelihood that
the judges who participate in the rulemaking process do not intend to infringe on the
judiciary's inherent powers. In this view, because rulemakers are likely to be protective
of existing judicial powers, it is realistic to presume-absent a clear statement to the
contrary-that a Rule is not intended to infringe on such powers. This argument,
however, assumes that the relevant intent is solely that of the judges who participate in
the rulemaking process. Not all those who serve on the Advisory Committee and
Standing Committee are judges; and Congress, which has the opportunity to review
proposed Rules before they take effect, is unlikely to share judges' solicitude for judicial powers. If anything, the participation ofjudges at the levels of the Advisory Committee, Standing Committee, Judicial Conference, and Supreme Court suggests that
the rulemakers will be well able to include language to protect judicial authority, if that
is the desired result; accordingly, no clear statement rule should be necessary.
134 Degen, 517 U.S. at 823.
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The Responsive Nature of the Rulemaking Process

In addition to the limits imposed by the Rules Enabling Act itself,
the relative ease with which amendments may be promulgated
through the rulemaking process counsels restraint in judicial interpretation of the Rules. Changed circumstances, which provide one argument forjudicial modification of statutory provisions, fail to provide
similar support for judicial revision of the Rules.1 35 Because the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment "make[] it
hard to enact or amend statutes, they must usually last for a long
time. "136 Over the years, circumstances may render the literal language of the statute, as originally drafted, undesirable-because "the
factual assumptions underlying the original statute [are] no longer...
valid," the statutory provision is "no longer.., consistent with widely
held social norms," or "the legal background [has] changed dramatically as a result of legislative and administrative innovations."1 "7 Thus,
advocates of dynamic statutory interpretation have argued that "[a] n
important reason for having an independent judiciary is to reassure
Congress that the statutes it enacts will remain efficacious over time
and not run wild or expire because of the inattention of subsequent
Congresses." 138 Courts, when asked to apply a statute to the facts of
the case at hand, have "the ability to consider carefully the consequences of adopting competing interpretations, the effect of postenactment developments, and the relevance of applications unforeseen by the legislature.' 139 Even apart from legislative inertia, "it may
be unrealistic to expect Congress to monitor every nook and cranny of
statutory policy from year to year, for that is the reason why Congress
delegates policy-making authority to agencies and courts.' 140 Thus,
commentators have argued that judges "must often exercise creativity

135 Lars Noah has made a similar argument
with respect to agencies' interpretations of legislative rules. See Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Placefor a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 296-97 (2000) ("If a legislative rule
must evolve to meet unforeseen contingencies, the agency has the means at its disposal
to revise the regulation directly, so courts need not tolerate the subterfuge of a newly
revised interpretation of the original text to accomplish the same end.").
136 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (1994).
137 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405,494-95 (1989).
138 ESKRIDGE, supra note 136, at 131.
139 Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing
Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory

Interetation,108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 627 (1995).
ESKRIDGE, supra note 136, at 131.
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in applying prior legislative directives to specific situations"' 14' and that
judges should seek "'to say what the legislator would have said had he
1 4
been present, and would have put into law if he had known.' 1
Moore has applied similar arguments to the interpretation of Rules,
arguing that "Rules should be interpreted to reflect changed circumstances," and that "[a] ffording the Court flexibility in considering policy is particularly important when the issue in a case concerns matters
143
unanticipated at the time of the framing of the Rule."
Moore's treatment of the obsolescence argument, however, neglects key differences between the legislative and rulemaking processes. 4 4 There is little need for courts to speculate how past rulemakers would have dealt with present circumstances because the Advisory
Committee and the Standing Committee exist expressly to "carry on a
continuous study of the [Rules'] operation and effect.' 4 Nor do the
rulemakers display legislative inertia: 146 in the sixty-three years since
the adoption of the Rules, the rulemaking process has produced some
twenty-four packages of revisions to the Rules,' including-since the
1988 amendments to the Enabling Act-eight packages of amendments affecting thirty-five different Rules. 4" Moore acknowledges that
Rules can also be changed by the rulemakers, but prefers alteration
via judicial decision because "amendments have to work their way

Id. at 125.
Id. at 50 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS,
bk. 5, ch. 10 (W.D.
Ross trans., 1984)).
143 Moore, supra note
3, at 1094-95.
144 Leslie Lunney has made a similar
point with respect to the interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Leslie A. Lunney, ProtectingJuriesfrom Themselves: Restricting the Admission of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REv. 103, 116-17
(1994) ("By creating a specific mechanism to amend the Rules, Congress intended the
judiciary to follow the procedure detailed in the [Rules Enabling] Act to implement
chanes in the Rules if such changes should appear necessary or desirable.").
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
146 Indeed, in 1993 "the pace of proposed
amendments" led Stephen Burbank to
caution that "[t]he 'continuous study of the operation and effect' of Federal Rules...
need not be, and it should not be, construed as an invitation to '[c]onstant reform."'
Burbank, supra note 113, at 854 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 331) .
147 See 12A ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE app. B at
72-73 (2001) (listing amendments to Rules). This figure counts (as one package) the
rules and amendments promulgated by the Court in November and December 1972,
even though Congress rejected or modified some of the proposed evidence rules and
enacted legislation adopting the remainder of the rules. The number does not include Rules changes made via legislation.
148This figure actually undercounts the number of Rules
affected by each set of
amendments because it counts only once each Rule that has been amended since
1988.
141
142
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through the often time-consuming rulemaking process," and to wait
for a formal amendment would "deprive the litigants of a fair and just
result in their case.",14" However, amendments normally take no more
50
than two or three years to emerge from the rulemaking process; the
pace of change via Supreme Court review of lower court decisions
surely cannot be much faster.
Moreover, Moore's preference for change via Supreme Court interpretation fails to take account of the Supreme Court's position in
the rulemaking framework. Admittedly, the responsiveness of the
rulemaking process at first glance might seem to cut both ways on the
question of interpretation: although the rulemakers stand ready to
respond to changed circumstances-thus perhaps obviating the need
for dynamic judicial interpretation-they can also correct erroneous
interpretations by the Court-thus possibly removing concerns about
judicial activism. Under the latter view, the Court need not scruple to
adhere closely to the Rule as drafted, because if it strays from the current preferences of the rulemakers the Rule can readily be
amended.'5' For example, the effect of the Court's expansive reading
of Rule 11 in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. -to reach a litigant that
had voluntarily dismissed its action-was tempered substantially by the
1993 amendments' provision of a safe harbor and limitations on
court-initiated monetary sanctions. 53 There is, however, an asymmetry
to the Court's involvement in the rulemaking process. A Court that
wishes to change a Rule, but resists doing so via interpretation, will
support (and transmit to Congress) a proposed amendment that effects the desired change; but a Court that has changed a Rule via in149
150

Moore, supra note 3, at 1095.
Mecham, supra note 35 ("From beginning to end, it usually takes two to three

years for a suggestion to be enacted as a rule.").
151 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1097 (supporting the
argument for a "flexible approach to interpretation" by noting that "if the Court errs.., the normal rulemaking
process or direct congressional intervention (in rare instances) would be available to
put the Rules back on track").
152 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
153 In Cooter & Gell the Court took an expansive view of the district court's
authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions, holding that district courts may impose Rule 11 sanctions even after the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(i). Id. at
395. This ruling created a risk that plaintiffs might be "sandbagged" by a court's unexpected post-dismissal imposition of sanctions. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11
address this problem in two ways: the safe harbor provision protects a plaintiff from
sanctions motions filed after a voluntary dismissal, and court-initiated monetary sanctions cannot be awarded "unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of" the pertinent claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2)(B)
(1993).
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terpretation may be reluctant to approve a proposed amendment that
would undo its work. The behavior of some current members of the
Court suggests that this concern is not fanciful: although a majority of
the Court did vote to transmit the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, one
of the reasons given by Justices Scalia and Thomas for dissenting from
the transmittal was that the amendments "contradict[]
what this Court
14
said only three years ago" in Cooter & Cell.
C. Other Advantages of the Rulemaking Process
On first consideration, it might seem that, to the extent that the
Supreme Court is involved in the rulemaking process, it is well qualified to make choices concerning changes to the Rules. 5' Compared
with the other rulemaking bodies, however, the Court appears less
representative, less knowledgeable, and perhaps more liable to engraft
erroneous policy choices on the Rules. As noted above, since 1988
Congress has required that any Advisory Committee created under the
Enabling Act include "members of the... professional bar" as well as
"trial and appellate judges." " 6 Though the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has sometimes lacked a strong practitioner presence, 15' the
statutory requirement at least ensures representation of some segments of the bar, and the notice-and-comment process permits input
from others. 15 8 By contrast, members of the Court may be more sensitive to the interests of the judiciary than to those of litigators,15 9 and154

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507, 508

(1993) (Scalia,J.,joined by Thomas,J., dissenting in part).
155 Indeed, the Court has accepted a similar
argument in the context of agency
rulemaking. "[W]hen an agency interprets a regulation that it has promulgated...
the Court has explained [that] the agency is in 'a better position ... to reconstruct the
purpose of the regulations in question,' in part because of its 'historical familiarity'
with the reasons for adopting the text in question." Manning, supra note 103, at 630.
156 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (2) (1994).
157 See, e.g.,
Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15-16 ("Today, of the committee's 12 members, six
are judges, three are law professors, one is a representative of the Justice Department
and only two are private practitioners.").
158 Similarly, the Standing Committee currently includes
a mix of district and
court of appeals judges and practitioners. In addition, legal academics serve on both
the Advisory and Standing Committees.
159 Thus, for instance, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, dissenting from the transmission of the 1993 amendments, were quick to dismiss the views of the "many lawyers
[who] do not like Rule 11," and relied instead upon alleged "overwhelming approval
of the Rule by... federal district judges." See Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 509, 510 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting in
part). Though there are few empirical data on judges' preferences, cf Jonathan R.
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as Justice Douglas noted years ago-the Court may lack relevant ex60
pertise compared with practitioners and lower courtjudges.' A lack
of personal experience, moreover, will not necessarily deter members
1
of the Court from assessing the Rules in the light of their intuitions
Macey, JudicialPreferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 627,
628 (1994) (noting that "the existing economic literature on the rules of procedure
uniformly has ignored the possibility of self-interest" on the part ofjudges); id. at 631
(developing "hypotheses about judicial preferences"); Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges andJustices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S.CT. ECON. REV. 1,
2 (1993) (modeling the utility function of federal appellate judges as "a function
mainly of income, leisure, and judicial voting"), it is not implausible to argue, for example, that 'Judges have a vested interest in reducing the workload of the courts, and
they may attempt to advance that agenda without sensitivity to the impact on the system as a whole, particularly the impact on the attorney-client relationship." Kaster &
Wittenberg, supra note 157, at 16; see also Burbank, supra note 113, at 848 (suggesting
that experience with "Rule 11 .... sanctions in general.... court-annexed arbitration[, and] managerial judging" illustrates the conflict between "the interests of the
judiciary narrowly viewed" and other interests); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and
Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 515 (1996) (noting "a view long held by some scholars.., that in making and applying procedural law judges attend to their own professional interests as well as to the interests of practicing lawyers, litigants, and society").
160See, e.g., Order of Apr. 22, 1974, 416 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1974) (Douglas, J.) (noting his opposition, with respect to proposed criminal rules, "to the Court's being a
mere conduit of Rules to Congress since the Court has had no hand in drafting them
and has no competence to design them"); Order of Apr. 24, 1973, 411 U.S. 992, 994
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I know enough about history, our Constitution, and
our decisions to oppose the adoption of Rule 920. But for most of these Rules I do not
have sufficient insight and experience to know whether they are desirable or undesirable. I must, therefore, disassociate myself from them."); Order of Nov. 20, 1972, 409
U.S. 1132, 1132-33 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (voicing doubts whether "rules of
evidence are within the purview" of § 2072, and arguing that the Court is "so far removed from the trial arena that we have no special insight, no meaningful oversight to
contribute").
Indeed, much of the litigation activity governed by the Rules currently takes place
outside the supervision of district judges and magistrate judges; thus, even trial level
judges may lack firsthand knowledge of the relevant issues. At any rate, the cases that
come before the Court are unlikely to reflect many of the realities of trial level litigation; but to the extent that they do, the limited nature of the Court's docket is likely to
skew its awareness of current practices and problems. Judge Weinstein has suggested
that a similar bias might color the Court's assessment of proposed amendments to the
Rules. SeeJack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures,76 COLUM. L.
REv. 905, 934 n.188 (1976) ("In the areas both of work product and privilege, contemporaneous litigation had apparently sharpened the Court's awareness of the subtleties
involved, making it less eager to adopt categorical rules.").
161To the extent that the Court perceives itself to have expertise in matters
of litigation procedure, this perception might induce overconfidence, thus leading the
Court to unwarranted boldness in implementing its views of desirable policy. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 813 (2001)
(positing that "[e]gocentric biases could lead judges to believe that they are better decision makers than is really the case"); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 74, 118 & n.172 (2000) (noting "cognitive biases that afflict experts, such as over-
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or policy preferences. 1G'
The dissents from the transmittal of the 1993 amendments lend
support to such concerns. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from
the transmittal of the amendments to Rule 11,13 complaining that
[t]he proposed revision would render the Rule toothless, by allowing
judges to dispense with sanction, by disfavoring compensation for litigation expenses, and by providing a 21-day "safe harbor" within which, if
the party accused of a frivolous filing
withdraws the filing, he is entitled
164
to escape with no sanction at all.
To support this view, Justice Scalia made some predictions concerning the behavior of districtjudges:
Judges, like other human beings, do not like imposing punishment when
their duty does not require it, especially upon their own acquaintances
and members of their own profession. They do not immediately see,
moreover, the system-wide benefits of serious Rule 11 sanctions, though
they are intensely aware of the amount of their own time
65 it would take to
them.
consider and apply sanctions in the case before

These observations-for which Justice Scalia cited no authoritycontrast somewhat with his own description of data gathered by the
Federal Judicial Center. To support his argument that "there appears
to be general agreement... that Rule 11, as written, basically works,"
Justice Scalia summarized data from a Federal Judicial Center survey
confidence"). Of course, members of the Advisory Committee and other rulemaking
decision makers may experience similar cognitive illusions, but the rulemaking process
likely helps to counterbalance decision makers' overconfidence by providing an opportunity for empirical study and by requiring review by more than one deliberative
body as well as public notice and comment.
62 Of course, even within the rulemaking process, a majority of the Court
could
block proposed amendments favored by the other rulemaking bodies; but it could not
implement amendments against the wishes of those bodies.
163In addition, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter dissented from the
transmittal
of the discovery-related amendments, terming them "potentially disastrous and certainly premature," and arguing that they would "increase litigation costs, burden the
district courts, and, perhaps worst of all, introduce into the trial process an element
that is contrary to the nature of our adversary system." 146 F.R.D. 507, 507, 510 (dissenting statement of Scalia,J.,joined in pertinent part by Thomas and Souter,JJ.).
164 Id. at 507-08 (dissenting statement of Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.).
165 Id. AlthoughJustice Scalia did not suggest
the existence of any data to support
these assertions, the topic would form an interesting basis for empirical study. Cf, e.g.,
Guthrie et al., supra note 161, at 805, 810 (noting that the representativeness heuristic
"can lead people to discount relevant statistical information," and arguing that the use
of this heuristic has sometimes "led judges to create erroneous legal doctrine"). It is
intriguing thatJustice Scalia-having implicitly acknowledged that such heuristics can
distort judicial decision making-nonetheless rested his objections to the amended
Rule 11 on survey responses by districtjudges. Infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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showing that "80% of districtjudges believe Rule 11 has had an overall
positive effect and should be retained in its present form... and
about 75% said the benefits justify the expenditure of judicial
time",66-views that hardly suggest undue judicial reluctance to impose Rule 11 sanctions. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the "general
agreement" to which he referred did not exist among lawyers, but concluded that "the overwhelming approval of the Rule by the federal districtjudges who daily grapple with the problem of litigation abuse is
me that it should not be gutted as the proposed
enough to persuade
' 67
revision suggests.'

Justice Scalia's arguments prompted Justice White-who also
wrote a statement-to chide the dissenters for second-guessing the
drafting and approval process:
I did my share of litigating when in practice and once served on the
Advisory Committee for the Civil Rules, but the trial practice is a dynamic profession, and the longer one is away from it the less likely it is
that he or she should presume to second-guess the careful work of the
active professionals manning the rulemaking committees, work that the
Judicial Conference has approved ....
Justice Douglas... refused to be a mere conduit and would dissent to
forwarding rule changes with which he disagreed. I note that JUSTICE
SCALIA seems to follow that example. But I also note that as time went
on, Justice Douglas confessed to insufficient familiarity with the context
68
their merits.
in which new rules would operate to passjudgment on

In response, Justice Scalia admitted to a lack of trial experience,
but nonetheless claimed competence to assess the amendments:
Never having specialized in trial practice, I began at the level of expertise
(and of acquiescence in others' proposals) with which Justice Douglas
ended. Both categories of revision on which I remark today, however,
seem to me not matters of expert detail, but rise to the level of principle
and purpose that even Justice Douglas in his later years continued to address. It takes no expert to know that a measure which eliminates rather
than strengthens a deterrent to frivolous litigation is not what the times
166146

F.R.D. at 509 (citing

INTERIM REPORT, supra note 38, reprinted in VAIRO, supra note 38, app. at 1-8 to 1-10). Justice Scalia's summary of the data provided in the
Interim Report was somewhat incomplete. For instance, his dissent did not mention
that the judges apparently were surveyed before the proposed amendments had been
circulated: thus, as the Interim Report observed, "It]he relatively low proportion of
judges... who favor some revision of the rule... may indicate not so much an aversion to amendment as a desire to keep the basic principles intact and the lack of any
particular amendment to consider." INTERIM REPORT, supra note 38, reprinted in
VAIRO, supra note 38, app. at 1-10.
167 146 F.R.D. at
509-10.
16 Id. at 504-05 (statement ofWhite,J.).
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demand ....

Admittedly, the Scalia/Thomas view failed to carry the day with
respect to the 1993 amendments; but the tendencies evident in the
dissent may influence the decisions of some Justices in other situations. Requiring that changes take place through the rulemaking
process-rather than through adjudication-at least increases the
chances that amendments will be subjected to a deliberative process
and informed by practical knowledge. In addition, the structure of
the rulemaking process facilitates informed and deliberative decision
making and permits a holistic approach to the revision of the Rules.'70
Although the rulemakers have not always made as much use of this
opportunity as they could, 7' the rulemaking process clearly affords
112
It also probetter access to empirical data than does adjudication.
vides a better framework for input by all interested persons and allows
the rulemakers to revise their proposals in response to such input.
Moreover, the rulemakers can amend several provisions at the same
time, which helps maintain coherence in the Rules'7 3 and permits finetuning of proposed changes. The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 provide a good example. In Pavelic, the Court had refused to hold that
the 1983 version of Rule 11 permitted sanctions against the law firm of

169
170

146 F.R.D. 507, 513 (Scalia, J.,joined by Thomas,J., dissenting in part).
Colin Diver has made a similar distinction between agency rulemaking and

agency adjudication: in adjudication
going beyond the case at hand requires the agency to expend resources investigating additional factual and policy issues. A private litigant is rarely willing
to assist in that effort, for the benefits will accrue primarily to others. Indeed,
a litigant seeking prompt results has a keen interest in minimizing the scope
of investigation.
Colin S. Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 40304(1981).
171 For example, with respect to the 1983
amendments to Rule 11,
[t]he Advisory Committee knew little about experience under the original
Rule, knew little about the perceived problems that stimulated the efforts
leading to the two packages of Rules amendments in 1980 and 1983, knew little about the jurisprudence of sanctions, and knew little about the benefits
and costs of sanctions as a case management device.
Burbank, supra note 60, at 1927 (footnotes omitted).
172 The process followed in drafting the 1993 amendments
to Rule 11 is illustrative: the Advisory Committee issued a call for comments, commissioned two empirical
studies by the Federal Judicial Center, and held public hearings on the proposed revisions.
173 Cf Bone, supra note 119, at 946 (arguing
that procedural rules are "interdependent," and therefore should be "tightly coordinated," because "[p]arties view a lawsuit as a unitary event with a single objective, and they pick their strategies at each
stage with an eye to the possible effects at every other stage").
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an offending attorney. 7 4 The 1993 amendments to Rule 11, by contrast, do permit law firm liability, but they also add the "safe harbor"
provision that permits the withdrawal of offending papers-a balance
that the Court could not have struck had it chosen, in Pavelic, to extend the 1983 version of the rule to law firms. Similarly, under the
1993 amendments, as under Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., a represented party can be sanctioned; but
the amended Rule prohibits the award of monetary sanctions against a
represented party for violations concerning legal (as opposed to factual) contentions. 76
III. DELEGATION AND INTERPRETIVE SOURCES

Both the structure of the Enabling Act and the actual rulemaking
process, then, counsel restraint in the interpretation of the Rules: the
Court should not reject authoritative sources of meaning in favor of its
own policy conception of a desirable Rule. This raises the question,
however, of what those authoritative sources might be (aside from the
text of the Rule). In the context of statutory interpretation, the answer to that question typically varies depending on whether the interpreter is willing to look to purpose or intent, as well as text. This Part
does not take sides in that debate (apart from assuming that a purposivist approach would fail to provide answers to most questions of
Rules interpretation177 ). Rather, it argues for an interpretive approach
that proceeds from an awareness of the scope of the Enabling Act

174See supra text accompanying notes 83-87 for a discussion of Pavelic.
175 498 U.S. 533
(1991).
176 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)
(A) (1993).
177 The statutes and rules that suggest the broad purposes of the Rules are unlikely
to resolve most interpretive issues. The relevant statutes direct the Standing Committee to recommend to the Judicial Conference such amendments "as may be necessary
to maintain consistency and otherwise promote the interest of justice," 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073(b) (1994), and direct the Judicial Conference, in turn, to recommend to the
Supreme Court those amendments that seem "desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay," 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). Rule 1, likewise,
provides that the Rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIv. P. 1. Such purposes are
likely to yield support for both sides of a given dispute. The aims of speed, simplicity,
and inexpensiveness, for example, may counsel one interpretation of a Rule, where the
goals of justice and fairness would support another. The observation that arguments
from purpose "are usually indeterminate because there is no neutral way to choose a
single statutory purpose," ESKRIDGE, supra note 136, at 29, thus applies equally in the
context of the Rules; and the interpretive search must proceed to other sources.
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delegation and that gives authoritative weight to the Advisory Committee Notes. Such an approach can be justified on both intentionalist and textualist grounds, and it reflects-to some degree-the methods observable in recent Supreme Court decisions.
Here, again, an example may help to clarify the stakes of the debate. For present purposes, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the
1983 version of Rule 11 provides a ready illustration of the dangers of
ignoring the Advisory Committee Notes, and of the Enabling Act concerns that may arise during a Rule's interpretation.
The 1983
amendments to Rule 11 were designed to minimize litigation abuses
by defining more precisely the standards to be met by attorneys who
signed litigation papers and by requiring sanctions for violations of
those standards. Judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the new rule with enthusiasm. "Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!" warned Judge Posner, in an early application
of the amended Rule: "The rules, whether statutory or judge-made,
designed to discourage groundless litigation are being and will continue to be enforced in this circuit to the hilt."7 "
Indeed, in its zeal to dig the knife in, the Seventh Circuit arguably
removed the hilt and fashioned a much longer, sharper blade than
the drafters of amended Rule 11 had envisioned. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 made sanctions mandatory upon a finding of violation and provided that "appropriate sanction[s] ... may include an
order to pay to the other party... the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'' v The use of the
term "sanction" suggests, and the Advisory Committee Note underscores, that the mandatory sanction was intended for deterrence,
rather than to compensate the opposing party.""' Thus, the Note explained that the word "sanctions" was added to the caption of Rule 11
178

Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247,

255-56 (7th Cir. 1986) (reversing the district court's denial of sanctions, and remanding for an award of attorney's fees under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and FED. R. APP. P. 38).
179 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (as amended effective Aug.
1, 1983). A redlined version of
Rule 11, showing the changes made by the 1983 amendments, is reprinted at 97 F.R.D.
196-97 (1983).
180 This point has already been
well made by others. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK,
RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL

RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 11 (1989) (marshalling the evidence from the text
and Note of the amendment to show that the goal of the Rule was deterrence, not
compensation). I review the argument here because it provides a ready example of
issues relating to the proper role of Advisory Committee Notes in interpretation (see
infra Part III.B).
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to emphasize "a deterrent orientation in dealing with improper plead8
ings, motions or other papers."' ' The Note justified the amendment
in incentive-oriented terms, claiming that "Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring abuses" and arguing that the amended Rule "should
discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litiga82
Nowhere in
tion process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses."
the text or Note was it suggested that compensation was or should be
a goal of sanctions under Rule 11.
Undeterred (so to speak) by the text and Note of Rule 11, the
Seventh Circuit transformed the Rule into a tort-like provision designed not merely to discourage violations but also to compensate injured parties.' 8,' As Judge Easterbrook explained in Szabo Food Service,
Inc. v. Canteen Corp., if a party "impose[s] costs on its adversary and the
4
Rule 11,
judicial system by violating Rule 11, it must expect to pay.',
protecthe
sanction-for
a
impose
to
court
the
"requires
in this view,
burden
financial
the
relieve
to
tion of the judicial process as much as
'' 8
that baseless litigation imposes on the other side. " The Szabo court
made the tort analogy explicit, stating that the Rule's "reasonable inquiry" requirement "does not require steps that are not cost-justified,"
and arguing that the Rule includes both an objective componentwhich "effectively picks up the tort[] of abuse of process"-and a
"subjective component"-which references "the tort[] of ...malicious
Soon afterward, Judge Posner elaborated the tort
prosecution.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at

181

199-200.
182 Id., reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 198.
183 Stephen Burbank has previously called attention to this phenomenon.

See

Burbank, supra note 60, at 1959 (noting that Hays v. Sony Corp. and Szabo Food Service,
Inc. v. Canteen corp. "assimilat[e Rule 11 ] to no fewer than three torts").
The Seventh Circuit did, on occasion, recognize deterrence as a goal of Rule 11.
See, e.g., Brown v. Fed'n of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Compensation, although an important consideration, is not the only purpose underlying Rule 11. An even more important purpose is deterrence."). The court appeared,
however, to contemplate that the goal of compensation would lead to larger sanctions,
in at least some cases, than would be justified on grounds of deterrence alone. Compare Brown, 830 F.2d at 1439 ("In some cases, the district court may choose to give a
small portion of the fees requested as a sanction. Compensation would not be the
primary motivating force behind such a sanction; rather, deterrence of the frivolous
litigation would be the court's purpose."), with id. at 1440 (holding that "[d]istrict
courts should provide specific findings when awarding substantial compensatory sanctions").
184 823 F.2d 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 1987).
185

Id. at 1082.

186

Id. at 1083.
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theme in Hays v. Sony Corp., reasoning that Rule 11 "imposes a negligence standard," and that "[r]estating the standard in negligence
terms helps one to see that Rule 11 defines a new form of legal malpractice.
In accordance with this view, the Hays court drew upon,
inter alia, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Prosser
Keeton on the
• •and188
Law of Torts, and a law review article on legal malpractice.
In addition to conceptualizing Rule 11 as a font of tort liability,
the Seventh Circuit recast the Rule as a fee-shifting provision. ' Thus,
in Brown v. Federationof State Medical Boards the court explained that
[c]ompensation is one thrust of Rule 11 ...primarily because Rule 11
was designed to implement the "bad faith exception to the American
Rule... that in a system requiring each party to bear its own fees and
costs, courts will ensure that each party really does bear the costs and
does not foist expenses off on its adversaries." 19 0

In Hays, the court relied on the premise that "Rule 11 is a fee-shifting
statute" to justify borrowing procedures developed under fee-shifting
provisions such as the Equal Access to Justice Act: 1'
a uniform body of law has grown up about such statutes entitling a party
who successfully invokes the statute to obtain reasonable fees incurred in
obtaining the statutory fees, plus reasonable fees in defending the award
on appeal ....There is no reason to complicate this body of law by making an exception for Rule 11 fee-shifting.1.2

The Seventh Circuit's analysis of Rule 11 as compensationoriented and as a fee-shifting provision did more than depart from the
187

847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Cooter & Gell v.

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
188 Id. at 419 (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 299A cmt. g (1965),

185 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984),

and Richard D. Bridgman, Legal Malpractice-A Consideration of the Elements of a Strong
Plaintiff's Case, 30 S.C. L. REV. 213, 227-30 (1979)).

Burbank has critiqued the Seventh Circuit's assertion in Hays that
"Rule 11 is a fee-shifting statute." See Burbank, supra note 60, at 1947 ("Of course it is
nothing of the sort ....).
190830 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (7th Cir. 1987) (second ellipsis
in original) (quoting In
reTCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985)).
191 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
192 Hays, 847 F.2d at 419. In this passage, the Hays court cited Westmoreland v. CBS,
Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which applied the amended Rule 11, and
McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1983), which applied the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The Supreme Court subsequently rejected
the argument that Rule 11 authorized a district court to award attorney's fees incurred
in defending a Rule 11 award on appeal. See Cooter & Gel, 496 U.S. at 406 ("Rule 11 is
more sensibly understood as permitting an award only of those expenses directly
caused by the filing, logically, those at the trial level.").
189Stephen
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Rule's text and Note; it also cast sharply into question the validity of
amended Rule 11 under the Rules Enabling Act. It is hard to see how
a rule that must not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
94
right"193 could "define a new form of legal malpractice"1 or parallel
the torts of malicious prosecution or abuse of process. Likewise, although fee-shifting statutes can serve a number of different goals, in95
cluding that of deterring undesirable litigation conduct,' they are often designed to affect both access to court and the enforcement of
substantive legal rights 9-purposes which fall outside the scope of
the Rules Enabling Act delegation.' 97 Indeed, similar concerns
formed the core of the Rules Enabling Act challenge addressed by the
Supreme Court in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic CommunicationsEnterprises,Inc.'98 The petitioner argued that

193 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).

Hays, 847 F.2d at 418.
See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651, 660-61 (noting that "deterrence of aggravated misconduct" is one aspect of the "punitive" rationale for fee-shifting, and that "[p]erhaps the
leading example of a fee shifting practice reflecting [fee-shifting for abuse of process]
is the federal courts' bad faith exception to the American rule for cases in which a
party refuses to recognize a clear legal right or engages in bad faith conduct in litigation").
196 See id. at 653 (noting that a fee-shifting provision can be justified by, inter alia,
"the public usefulness of advancing a particular type of claim," "a desire to affect the
relative strengths of the parties," or the provision's "expected or actual economic incentive effects"). For example, the Equal Access to Justice Act's statements of findings
and purpose indicate that the Act was designed to alleviate concerns that certain persons "may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable
governmental action because of the expense involved." Equal Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (1980); see also Rowe, supra note 195, at
664 (arguing that Congress appears to have intended the Equal Access to Justice Act to
address a perceived imbalance of resources in certain types of litigation between private parties and the federal government); John J. Sullivan, Note, The Equal Access tojustice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (1984) (quoting legislative
history to support proposition that the goals of the Act included "remov[ing] the 'economic deterrents to contesting government action"' and enlisting private litigants in
"'refining and formulating public policy"').
197 As Stephen Burbank and Linda Silberman have noted,
[t]he experience with Rule 11 reveals how delicate is the balance between the
use of attorney fee-shifting to deter litigation misconduct and its use to effect
social policy concerning access to court. Indeed, Congress' ultimate decision
in the securities legislation to include provisions for mandatory and presumptive fee-shifting sanctions for violations of Rule 11 rather than fee-shifting tied
to the result, makes the point eloquently.
Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil ProcedureReform in Comparative Context:
The United States ofAmerica, 45 AM.J. COMP. L. 675, 694-95 (1997) (citation omitted).
198 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
194

195
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Rule 11, to the extent that it imposes on represented parties an objective
standard of reasonableness, exceeds the limits of the Court's power in
two ways: (1) It authorizes fee shifting in a manner not approved by
Congress; and (2) it effectively creates a federal tort of malicious prose1
cution, thereby encroaching upon various state law causes of action.' 99
No member of the Court attempted to argue, in response, that a fee-

shifting, tort-style Rule 11 would pass muster under the Rules Enabling Act; instead, a majority of the Court dismissed the Rules Enabling Act challenge on the grounds that "'Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting
statute' 20 0 and that "[t]he main objective of the Rule is not to reward
parties who are victimized by litigation; it is to deter baseless filings
and curb abuses. '2 ' For the latter proposition the Court cited its earlier decision in Cooter & Gell, which had in turn relied upon the Advisory Committee Note to support the conclusion that "the central pur,2
pose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court. 02
Remarkably, even after the Supreme Court's rejection of the
compensation approach, the Seventh Circuit persisted in applying
it.
Perhaps in response to such behavior, the 1993 amendments inserted an explicit reference to the deterrence rationale into the text of
Rule 11, which now provides that the sanction imposed "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated."2 0 4 Such an amendment
would have been unnecessary had courts heeded the 1983 Notes' emphasis on deterrence. The deterrence/compensation debate thus
demonstrates the effects of disregarding the Advisory Committee
Notes. It also illustrates that the interpretation of a Rule may be col-

ored by concerns about the Enabling Act's prohibition on Rules that
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights. I take up those two issues in the sections that follow.

199 Id. at
200

(1990)).
201

551-52.
Id. at 553 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 409
Id.

Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note (1983)); see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126
2

(1989) ("The purpose of the provision in question, however, is not reimbursement but

'sanction' ....
).
203 See Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc., 960 F.2d
640, 64546 (7th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging the Supreme Court's statement that Rule 1l's purpose is deterrence rather
than reimbursement, but citing Seventh Circuit decisions from the mid-1980s for the
proposition that "[c]ase law acknowledges compensation as another important objective and purpose for Rule 11").
204 FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(2)
(1993).
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The Limits of the Delegation

Because the Enabling Act limits the permissible scope of the
Rules, the interpretation of a Rule should either yield a meaning that
obeys the Act's constraints or result in invalidation of the Rule. Accordingly, interpreters should take care to enforce the Act's admonition that the rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right., 20 5 Here, however, a problem arises. Decades ago, Justices
Black and Douglas noted "the embarrassment of having to sit in
judgment on... rules which we have approved and which as applied
2 0'
Such embarin given situations might have to be declared invalid."
rassment might help to explain the fact that the Court has never invalidated a Rule for violating the Enabling Act. To the contrary, the
Court has created a presumption of validity for the Rules based on
their transmission by the Court and on Congress's failure to enact legislation to prevent them from taking effect. The Court has balanced
this presumption, however, by holding that the Rules are to be interpreted so as to avoid Enabling Act problems. This avoidance doctrine
is preferable to the enforcement of a Rule that exceeds the scope of
the delegation; but it is a second-best alternative. Ideally, the Court
should abandon the presumption of Rule validity and directly enforce
the terms of the delegation.
The Court's notorious failure to police the Act's prohibition on
Rules affecting substantive rights-combined with a blurring of the
distinction between substance and procedure °7-has led many commentators to view the prohibition as a matter of merely theoretical in205
206

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
Order of Jan. 21, 1963, 374 U.S. 865, 870 (1963) (Black & Douglas, J1.).

(The

quoted statement referred to questions of the Rules' constitutionality; but the concern
applies equally to questions of validity under the Enabling Act.)
207 See, e.g.,
Bone, supra note 119, at 914 ("It is simply not possible to separate out a
");see also, e.g.,
domain of purely technical procedure divorced from substance ....
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (noting "the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules" and admitting that "this Court's
rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and political in the sense
that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants"
(citation omitted)). Nonetheless, careful analysis can provide guidelines for assessing
compliance with the Enabling Act's restrictions, without necessitating "a particularistic
and after-the-fact inquiry into policies animating competing legal prescriptions."
Burbank, supra note 11, at 1191. For example, Stephen Burbank has argued that Rules
overstep the bounds of the Act if their creation "necessarily involves the consideration
of public policy-policies extrinsic to the process of litigation," as when a Rule has
"predictable and identifiable" effects on rights recognized under substantive law or
creates "remedial rights that predictably or identifiably affect personal liberty or the
use and enjoyment of property." Id. at 1128, 1190.
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terest. 1 8 Soon after the promulgation of the initial set of Rules, the
Court-faced in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. with the contention "that
Rules 35 and 37 work a major change of policy and that this was not
intended by Congress"20--set a presumption of validity for Rules
promulgated under the Act: "Evidently the Congress felt the rule was
within the ambit of the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it
from the proposed body of rules, although this specific rule was attacked and defended before the committees of the two Houses. '1 0
The difficulties with such a view are evident: Congressional inaction
might indicate approval, but it may also stem from lack of interest,
from indecision, or from the fact that other matters took precedence. 21' As Justice Frankfurter argued in dissent: "Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to
draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress is to
appeal to unreality. 2 12 Unreality, however, has its uses, and the Court
has continued to rely upon the presumption of validity,2 13 which it

208See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments
to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 997, 1006-07
(1983) ("As long as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. remains law and the Court that promulgates Federal Rules and amendments has the final word on their validity, disputations
regarding validity and invalidity are likely to be of purely academic interest.
).
209312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941).
210 Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
211 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 136, at 247
("What does the inaction establish? There
are as many reasons for Congress not to act as there are members of Congress-ranging from complete disinterest to indecision, higher priority for other measures, dislike
of one feature of the bill, or approval of existing law." (footnote omitted)).
212 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 18
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480
U.S. 1, 6 (1987) (unanimous decision) ("[T]he study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the statutory requirement that the
Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review before taking effect ...give the
Rules presumptive validity under both the constitutional and statutory constraints."
(citations omitted)).
The Court revealed both doubts concerning, and a continuing allegiance to, the
presumption of validity when it dismissed, as improvidently granted, the writ of certiorari in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (per curiam). The certified question in Ticor asked "'whether a federal court may refuse to enforce a prior
federal class action judgment, properly certified under Rule 23, on grounds that absent class members have a constitutional due process right to opt out of any class action which asserts monetary claims on their behalf."' Id. at 120-21 (quoting Petition
for Certiorari, at i). Although this question would be "of no general consequence if,
whether or not absent class members have a constitutional right to opt out of such actions, they have a right to do so under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"-i.e., if
damages class actions could be certified only "under Rule 23(b) (3), which permits opt-
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elaborated in Hannav. Plumer "When a situation is covered by one of
the Federal Rules," a court can refuse to apply the Rule "only if the
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima
facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the
21 4
Unsurterms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions."
prisingly, the Court has never found215a promulgated Rule to transgress
the limitations of the Enabling Act.
Despite the Court's unwillingness to scrutinize Rules for compliance with the substantive rights restriction, it has made some attempts
to reconcile the presumption of validity with the constraints of the
Enabling Act. The majority in Business Guides quoted Hanna's language on the presumption of validity, but it also devoted three pages
of its opinion to an analysis of the contention that "imposing sanctions
against a represented party that did not act in bad faith violates the
Rules Enabling Act., 2' 6 Although the Court rejected the Enabling Act
challenge, it did so by interpreting Rule 11 to avoid some of the possi-

out, and not under Rules 23(b) (1) and (b) (2), which do not"-the Ticor parties were
bound by a prior lower court decision holding that the class was properly certified under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2), so that in Ticor"the alternative of using the Federal Rules
instead of the Constitution as the means of imposing an opt-out requirement for this
settlement [was] no longer available." Id. at 121. The Court expressed reluctance to
address the constitutionality of Rule 23, arguing that "[i]f the Federal Rules, which
generally are not affirmatively enacted into law by Congress, are not entitled to that
great deference as to constitutionality which we accord federal statutes, they at least
come with the imprimatur of the rulemaking authority of this Court." Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court expressed concern that if it assumed that Rule 23
permits non-opt-out damages class actions and proceeded to assess the constitutionality of the Rule so construed, it might "approve, in the mistaken deference to prior Supreme Court action and congressional acquiescence, action that neither we nor Congress would independently think constitutional." Id. at 122. The Court did not
explain why--having noted the dangers of the presumption of validity-it would nonetheless apply it. Ticor, though it concerned constitutional rather than Enabling Act
limitations, provides an illustration of the Court's preference for resolving questions of
Rule validity through construction, rather than invalidation, of the Rule. Infra text accompanying notes 216-22.
14 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)
(citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13-15). But seeMiss. Publ'g
444 (1946) ("The fact that this Court promulgated
438,
U.S.
326
v.
Murphree,
Corp.
the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or consistency.").
215 The Court has not always been so self-deferential.
See Meek v. Centre County
Court's General Order in
the
invalid
Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426, 434 (1925) (holding
Bankruptcy No. 8 on the ground that "[t]he authority conferred upon this court by §
30 of the Bankruptcy Act to prescribe all necessary rules, forms and orders as to procedure and for carrying the Act into effect, is plainly limited to provisions for the execution of the Act itself, and does not authorize additions to its substantive provisions").
216 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533,
551-54 (1991).
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ble Enabling Act concerns: thus, it reaffirmed that the Rule "is not a
fee-shifting statute," that the Rule's "main objective" is not compensation but deterrence, and that district courts should "resist the tempta'
tion to use sanctions as substitutes for tort damages."217
More recently,
21 s
in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., the Court rejected an expansive view of
the non-opt-out classes authorized by Rule 23(b) (1) (B), based in part
on Enabling Act constraints.
Noting that "the text of Rule
23(b) (1) (B) is on its face open to a more lenient... concept," the
Court argued that its narrower interpretation "minimizes potential
conflict with the Rules Enabling Act, and avoids serious constitutional

concerns.
Minimizing conflict with the Enabling Act is a worthy goal, but it
can invite departure from a Rule's text and Notes. Last Term, in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 22 a unanimous Court
dismissed the contention that Rule 41 governs the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court judgment, noting that "such a rule would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling
Act., 22' The Court thereby avoided invalidating the Rule; but as Stephen Burbank has explained, the Court's interpretation strains the
222
Rule's text and contravenes its history.
The awkwardness of such interpretations is underlined, moreover, to the extent that the Court
views the Enabling Act limitation as serving federalism, and not sepa-

Id. at 553; see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991)
(unanimous decision) (citing an Enabling Act limitation as the ground for holding
that Rule 23.1 does not create a demand requirement in shareholder derivative suits).
Three of the Business Guides dissenters argued that the avoidance rationale instead
supported their position: "Whether or not Rule 11 as construed by the majority exceeds our rulemaking authority, these concerns weigh in favor of a reasonable, alternative interpretation." Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
218527 U.S. 815 (1999).
219 Id. at 842; see also Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997)
("Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large
load CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.").
220 531 U.S. 497
(2001).
221 Id. at 503. The Court concluded that Rule 41(b) simply bars refiling of the
217

same claim in the same federal district court, and does not govern the claim-preclusive
effect of the judgment in other courts. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505-06.
222Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping and Federal Common
Law, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 113-20 (2002). Admittedly, the Semtek Court's interpretation
of Rule 41 (b) is unlikely to work serious mischief. In other instances, however, departures from a Rule's text and Notes may not be so innocuous. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 179-203 (describing the Seventh Circuit's interpretations of Rule
11).
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ration of powers, concerns: in cases where that vision guides Enabling
Act scrutiny, the Court's avoidance doctrine can produce Rules that
have one meaning in diversity cases and another in federal question
223
cases.
In instances where a Rule as drafted plainly violates the Enabling
Act, then, the Court's unwillingness to invalidate Rules poses a dilemma. According the text its apparent meaning will result in the application of a Rule that, by impermissibly affecting substantive rights,
violates the Enabling Act. Avoiding Enabling Act problems by departing from the text and Notes, however, contravenes the principlewhich I argue derives from the Enabling Act's structure-that the
Court should not rewrite a Rule through interpretation. Admittedly,
avoidance-driven revisions may seem less intrusive than policy-driven
revisions: the driving principle behind avoidance is fidelity to the Enabling Act, not indulgence of the Court's own policy preferences, and
it might be argued that rulemakers who exceed their authority should
not be heard to complain when the Court rewrites their handiwork.
As with other judicial revisions of the Rules, however, the structure of
the rulemaking process urges caution. Invalidation of an amended
Rule would return the situation to the status quo prior to that
amendment's promulgation; by contrast, redrafting the Rule on
avoidance grounds creates a Rule that never proceeded through the
rulemaking process. 224 Just as a Court's ability to veto a proposed
amendment does not grant it the power to enact such an amendment
through interpretation, the Court's duty to invalidate Rules that
transgress the Enabling Act limitation does not authorize it to revise a
Rule in the name of avoiding Enabling Act problems.
As Business Guides illustrates, not all Enabling Act issues concern
Rules that plainly transgress the Act's substantive rights limitations.
Where the text and Notes permit two interpretations, one of which
would violate the Enabling Act, the Court's avoidance doctrine may
properly apply. In cases like Semtek, however-where avoidance distorts a Rule's text or contradicts its Notes-the Court should abandon
223 See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion:
The Supreme Court, FederalRules
and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 701, 705 (1988) (concluding, based on
Walkerv. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740 (1980), a diversity case, and West v. Conrail 481 U.S.
35 (1987), a federal question case, that the Court believes Rule 3 to have "two plain
meanings").
224 Cf Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited,
1995 SuP. CT. REv. 71, 74 ("[I]t is by
no means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less ajudicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute.").
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the presumption of validity and hold that the Rule violates the Act.
B.

25

Advisory Committee Notes

Those who view the Court's role in rulemaking as conferring
broad interpretive discretion are apt to dismiss the Advisory Committee Notes as nonbinding. Judge Moore, for instance, argues that the
dispositive interpretive consideration should be, not the Notes, but
the promulgating Court's own understanding of the Rule-even if
that understanding was never publicly expressed. 22r The Court itself
has not explicitly relied on such a bold rationale, but it consistently
refuses to accord the Notes binding authority-despite ascribing such
authority to similar sources in other contexts. A review of the role of
the Notes in the rulemaking process, however, demonstrates that the
Advisory Committee Notes possess distinctive claims to authority,
based both on the terms of the Enabling Act and on the practicalities
of rulemaking.2 7
1. Intentionalism and the Notes
An intentionalist analysis of the Rules faces two initial questions.
First, the interpreter must determine which of the institutional players
in the rulemaking process, if any, might be ascribed an intent that
should give meaning to the Rule. Second, assuming the choice of one
such body, the usual issues arise concerning the aggregation of intents
within a multimember entity. Consideration of these questions indicates that the Advisory Committee Notes provide a legitimate source
225 Although the discussion in the text
focuses on the role of the Supreme Court
in interpreting Rules, I also believe that lower federal courts should choose invalidation over avoidance when the latter would twist the text of a Rule or contradict the pertinent Advisory Committee Note. Although lower courts might hesitate to hold that a
Rule approved by the Supreme Court violates the Rules Enabling Act, such a holding is
preferable to an interpretation that contravenes the clear import of the text and Notes.
Moreover, in some instances a district court might hold a Rule invalid "as applied"
(rather than facially invalid), in which event the district court need not be seen as striking down an application necessarily envisioned by the Supreme Court when the latter
approved the Rule for transmission to Congress.
226 See Moore, supra note 3, at 1094 ("It is possible that
the Court, in adopting a
particular Rule, had a different view of purpose or policy that may or may not have
been expressed publicly and that should be considered when interpreting a Rule.").
227 Some other potential interpretive
sources are open to criticisms similar to
those advanced in the debates over statutory interpretation. Thus, although the drafting history of the Rules amendments has become more readily available, its use may
provoke objections similar to those customarily leveled at reliance on statutes' legislative histories.
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of interpretive authority.
2281
Despite Supreme Court rhetoric to the contrary, it would-as
noted above-be problematic to assign an intent to Congress with respect to Rules promulgated under the Enabling Act. It is, of course,
true that the rulemakers may be influenced by their perception of
preferences within Congress. 229 Thus, the rulemakers may consider
changes to the Rules in order to forestall a dissatisfied Congress from
drafting legislation. Similarly, the prospect of congressional action
may be the most significant incentive for the rulemakers to observe
the bounds of the Act's delegation. 230 Even if Congress's anticipated
responses influence the decisions of the rulemakers, however, the re1
sulting Rules cannot be seen as a product of congressional action
and they provide no reliable indication of any particular congressional
intent. Finally, to the extent that Congress's failure to prevent a Rule
from taking effect might indicate some legislators' approval of the
Rule, the materials set before Congress would generally provide the
For example, the Court employed such rhetoric in Irwin v. Department of VeteransAffairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92-93 (1990), when it cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 as
evidence that "Congress has endorsed [the] practice" of service upon a party's attorney-notwithstanding the fact that Congress had never taken any legislative action
with respect to Rule 5. Similarly, the dissentingJustices in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211 (1995), contended that the "clear congressional intent" expressed in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), id. at 257 n.9 (Stevens, J.,joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), provided an example of an instance "'in which Congress has attempted to
set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation,"' id. at 252
(Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). The Plaut
majority neglected to make the obvious response-that Rule 60(b), which was promulgated (and amended) pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act without any congressional
action at all, was not an example of congressional legislation. Instead, the majority
implicidy adopted the dissent's view of Rule 60(b) as an example of congressional action and attacked the dissent's Rule 60(b) argument for, inter alia, "inver[ting] the
statutory presumption regarding retroactivity [that] statutes do not apply retroactively
unless Congress expressly states that they do." Id.at 236-37 (majority opinion). And in
Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996),Justice Scalia concluded his
dissent by complaining of "the Court's precedent-setting disregard of Congress's instructions in Rule 59," id. at 469 (Scalia, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting)--despite the fact that Rule 59 had never been the subject of congressional
action.
Cf Bone, supra note 119, at 924 (noting that "a public choice analysis should
treat court rulemaking as a strategic game among the Advisory Committee, Congress,
and the various interest groups").
230 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 208, at 1006-07 (positing that under
the current
framework of rulemaking and rule interpretation, "the remedy, if any, to overreaching
[by the rulemakers] will come by way of congressional action").
231 See, e.g., id. at 1011 ("It should be obvious that I do not regard
the 'laying before' provision of the Rules Enabling Act as a substitute for, or as equivalent to, congressional action.").
228
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best indication of what such legislators thought they were approving.
Those materials, as noted above, are the text of the Rule and its accompanying Note.
In contrast to Congress, the Supreme Court has (at least in form)
an active role in the promulgation process. Based on this role, proponents of Supreme Court interpretive discretion have argued that
the Court may disregard the Notes in favor of its own view of the
Rules' intended purposes.133 Such an argument, however, is triply erroneous. First, the extent to which a majority of the Court even considers the merits of a proposed Rule is unclear. The disclaimers given
over the years by Justices Frankfurter, 234 Powell, 235 Stewart,2263 and
Rehnquist,
as well as the protestations of Justices Black and Doug2381
las, strongly suggest that the Court has often functioned merely as a
"conduit" for rules amendments. Second, even if the Court considers
the substance of a Rule when voting to approve it, the Court's laconic
orders and transmittal letters give no indication of its understanding
of the Rule.3 9 Since the Court is obviously not the only decision

232

Cf Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 411 (arguing that the Notes to the Federal

Rules of Evidence should be entitled to "significant weight" because, inter alia, "the
notes physically accompanied the draft rules through every stage of congressional consideration").
Other pieces of drafting history, such as transmittal letters from the Advisory
Committee or the Standing Committee, may also accompany the text and Notes of the
Rule when they are sent to the Court and then to Congress. In such instances, the letters, like the text and Notes, might prove informative; but-unlike the Notes-such
documents would not necessarily have accompanied the proposal during the earlier
stages of public comment and redrafting.
233 See Bauer, supra note 3, at 728
("[S]ince it is the Supreme Court which had the
responsibility for promulgating the Rule under scrutiny, the historical views of the Advisory Committee-which merely drafted the Rule-of its meaning should be entitled
only to limited weight."); Moore, supra note 3, at 1093-94 (contending that "the comments of the Advisory Committee and the other bodies involved in the promulgation
process" are "useful," but that the Supreme Court "should not be bound" by them
when it interprets the Rules).
234 See supra note 116 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's
statement concerning the
1946 amendments).
25
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (quoting the statement
of Justice
Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenting from adoption of the 1980
amendments to discovery rules).
236

See id.(same).

See id. (same); supra note 118 and accompanying text
(quoting Chief Justice
Rehnuist's letter transmitting the 1993 amendments to Congress).
See supra notes 114-15 (citing dissents by Justices Black and/or Douglas from
the Court's promulgation of various rules and amendments).
239 Of course, dissents from orders
of transmittal provide an indication of the understanding of the dissenter, but there is no evidence that such an understanding is
237
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maker in the process, the rulemaking framework forecloses the possibility that the promulgating Court's unexpressed understanding of a
Rule should govern the Rule's future interpretation. Suppose the
Court transmits Rule "X" to Congress only because the Court believes
that the Rule actually means "not X." The "not X" understanding,
which appears neither in the text nor the Note of the proposed Rule,
has not been considered, let alone approved, by the Advisory Committee, the public, the Standing Committee, or the Judicial Conference,
and therefore it should not control future interpretations of the Rule.
Third, the Court that interprets a Rule will not always be the same
Court that promulgated it. Thus, even if it were legitimate for the
Court to apply its prior unexpressed view of the Rule, there would be
substantial doubt as to the Court's ability to reconstruct that view. As
with Congress, the most reliable indicators of the Court's intent will
be the items it considered and transmitted: the text and Notes of the
Rule.
On occasion, the Court suggests that the relevant question is what
the Advisory Committee intended. In Business Guides, for instance, the
Court explained its rejection of an alternate reading of Rule 11 by
stating that "there is no indication that this is what the Advisory
Committee intended," and that it would not adopt such a reading "absent a compelling indication in the text that the Advisory Committee
intended such a result.,141 Moreover, though such statements might

shared by the majority.
240 Indeed, given the terse style of the Court's typical transmittal letters, it
is also
unlikely that Congress will be made aware of the "not X" understanding. Even if the
Court explains the "not X" view in its transmittal letter to Congress, however, that will
not cure the fact that the prior stages of the rulemaking process included no mention
of the "not X" interpretation.
241 498 U.S. 533, 544, 546 (1991).
In Business Guides, the Court held that Rule 1l's
"objective standard of reasonable inquiry" applied not only to attorneys and pro se litigants, but also to "represented parties who sign papers or pleadings." Id. at 554. Although Rule 1I's signing requirement applied only to attorneys and unrepresented
parties, its certification provision stated that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer" that, inter alia, "the signer has read" the paper and
"to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry [the paper] is well grounded in fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983). In turn, Rule
1l's sanctions provision required that "[i]f a... paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court ...shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction." Id. The Court, having noted its resolve to give the
Rules "'their plain meaning,"' Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 540 (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989)), argued that the certification
and sanctions provisions "seem[] plain: A party who signs a pleading or other paper
without first conducting a reasonable inquiry shall be sanctioned." Id. at 541. Even in
situations where a party is not required to sign a paper, the Court reasoned, if the party
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seem to suggest that the Advisory Committee's intent could be shown
only by the text of the Rule, the Business Guides Court relied upon the
242
Notes to resolve a further question.

No matter which body's understanding is at issue, then, the most
logical evidence of such intent can be found in the Rule's text and
Advisory Committee Notes. Moreover, the Notes avoid the aggregation problem that an intentionalist analysis might otherwise present.
Judith Resnik has cautioned that articles later published by individual
members of the original Advisory Committee may not reflect the views
of the Committee as a whole, because "it is difficult to establish the existence of shared intentionality. 2' 43 By contrast, the text and Notes of

does sign the paper the signature triggers Rule lI's certification provision. Id. at 544.
To rule otherwise, in the Court's view, would require rewriting the certification provision "to mean 'attorney or unrepresented party."' Id. The Court refused "to adopt this
unnatural reading," because it found "no indication" that such a reading was "what the
Advisory Committee intended." Id. Two pages later, the Court adopted a clear statement requirement concerning Advisory Committee intent, based on the Court's view
of an underlying premise of Rule 11:
Business Guides asks that we construe Rule 11 in a way that would render the
signatures on these statements risk free. Because this construction is at odds
with the Rule's general admonition that signing denotes merit, we are loath to
do so absent a compelling indication in the text that the Advisory Committee
intended such a result.
Id. at 546.
242 The Court's conclusion that signing subjected parties
to Rule lI's certification
provisions required it to decide "whether the certification standard for a party is the
same as that for an attorney." Id. at 548. Here, again, the Court proclaimed itself
bound by the "plain language," and supported by the policies, of Rule 11. Id. at 54849. Rule 11, the Court reasoned, "states unambiguously that any signer must conduct
a 'reasonable inquiry' or face sanctions ....Even if we were convinced that a subjective bad faith standard would more effectively promote the goals of Rule 11, we would
not be free to implement this standard outside of the rulemaking process." Id.
Moreover, "as a policy matter ....[q]uite often it is the client, not the attorney, who is
better positioned to investigate the facts supporting a paper or pleading." Id. at 549.
Thus, "[a] contrary rule would establish a safe harbor such that sanctions could not be
imposed where an attorney, pressed to act quickly, reasonably relies on a client's careless misrepresentations." Id. at 549-50. Despite its emphasis on the Rule's "plain language," however, the Court stated-based on the Notes' observation that the applicable standard "'is one of reasonableness under the circumstances, '--that the reasonable
inquiry required of a represented party might differ from that required of an attorney.
Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 550-51 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's

note (1983)).

243Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219,
2221 & n.4 (1989)
(citing Charles E. Clark, FundamentalChanges Effected ty the New FederalRules I, 15 TENN.
L. REv. 551, 560 (1939), and Edson R. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA.
L.Q. 5, 30 (1938)). In an earlier article, Resnik had discussed this point in more detail:
Of course, I do not (and could not) claim to know the thoughts of the diverse
individuals.. . who comprised the Advisory Committee that prepared drafts of
the Rules for the Supreme Court, nor do I assume that they shared a collective
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a Rule cannot be forwarded for promulgation without a majority of
votes in each decision-making body (the Advisory Committee, the
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme
Court). The language of a proposal approved and forwarded by a
rulemaking body presumably reflects the intent of those who vote in
favor of it; and the current rulemaking framework indicates that Notes
are as much the product of the formal drafting and approval process
as is the text of the Rule. As discussed in Part I.E above, the Notes are
mandated by the Enabling Act and accompany the text through each
44
Although
stage of circulation, comment, revision, and approval.
we or
either
that
Justice Scalia has argued that "there is no certainty
[Congress] read [the Notes], nor is there any procedure by which we
' 45
his own dissent from the
formally endorse or disclaim them,
Court's transmittal of the 1993 amendments illustrates that he, at any
rate, considers an objectionable Note to be a basis for dissenting from
246
the promulgation of a Rule.
"intent." Indeed, from the history of the drafting debates (and from what one
knows of life in general), it must be supposed that there was a fair amount of
disagreement within the group. Further, not all the voices of those on the
Advisory Committee can be heard distinctly today. The academics on the
Committee have left the richest record; the practicing lawyers' views are less
accessible.
Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
498-99 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Despite these conceptual problems, the Court sometimes relies heavily on the
views of an Advisory Committee Reporter. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 613-19 (1997) (construing Rule 23 and relying repeatedly on language
from articles published in 1967 and 1969 by the Reporter for the Advisory Committee
that drafted the 1966 amendments to the Rules).
244 See Noah, supra note 135, at 313 ("[Tlhe advisory committee notes are transmitted to Congress in tandem with the text of the rules in the same way that committee
reports accompany a bill to the floor .. ").
245 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 168 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (discussing FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's
note). Although Evidence Rule 801 (at issue in Tome) had been enacted via legislation, Justice Scalia appears to have directed his critique both at Notes to Rules promulgated without congressional interference and at Notes to Rules that were legislatively
enacted. See id. at 167 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("It is the words of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted-by this Court, or
by Congress if it makes a statutory change.").
246 Justice Scalia's asserted bases for dissent included the Note as well as the text of
the proposed Rule, apparently on the assumption that the Note's admonitions would
be binding: quoting the Note (not the text), Justice Scalia argued that "the likelihood
that frivolousness will even be challenged is diminished by the proposed Rule, which restricts the award of compensation to 'unusual circumstances,' with monetary sanctions
'ordinarily' to be payable to the court." Order of Apr. 22, 1993, 146 F.R.D. 404, 508-09
(Scalia,J.,joined by Thomas,J., dissenting in part) (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory
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Textualism and the Notes

The fact that the Notes proceed through the approval process
along with the text also helps to meet textualist objections to their use.
Admittedly, the Notes perform functions for which statutory texts are
not generally used; but-seen in the light of their creation-the Notes
in some ways resemble text more than legislative history. Thus, as will
be seen, the criticisms that textualists have leveled against the use of
such history lack the same force when applied to the Notes.
As discussed in Part I.E, the Notes, in addition to informing the
rulemaking process itself, can serve a number of functions postpromulgation: they can explain the reasons behind the amendment,
discuss the Rule's application to particular situations, consider the
amendment's relation to surrounding law, and provide practice
guides forjudges and lawyers to use when applying the Rule. In some
of these respects, the Notes appear similar to the Comments to the
Uniform Commercial Code ("Official Comments"); the Notes' mode
of adoption, however, differs significantly from that of the Official
Comments. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, in conjunction with the American Law Institute, supervises
and approves the creation of proposed UCC provisions; each provision becomes law only when adopted by the legislature of the relevant
state. 247 Unlike the Rules, which in most instances become law by default (through congressional inaction), the UCC provisions must be
enacted affirmatively by the state legislatures; moreover, the legislatures do not always have the Official Comments before them at the
committee's note (1993)); see also id. at 509 (Scalia, J.,joined by Thomas, J., dissenting
in part) (objecting that "the commentary makes it clear that even when compensation
is granted it should be granted stingily-only for costs 'directly and unavoidably caused
by the violation"' (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993))).
Eileen Scallen has noted that it is
highly improbable that United States Supreme CourtJustices would transmit
proposed rules.., to Congress without reading both the rules and their accompanying commentary. Moreover, there certainly is a means of disapproving both the Notes and the proposed rules themselves. When the Chief Jus-

tice transmits the rules to Congress, it is with an explanatory letter that can
even contain dissenting views. Justice Scalia himself has made use of this to
make his opinions very clear.

Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the FederalRules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1283, 1300 (1995) (footnotes omitted).

247 See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: SECURED TRANSACTIONS 1-7 (5th ed. 2000); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
The PoliticalEconomy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 600-02 (1995) (describing roles of the ALl and the NCCUSL in drafting and promulgation of UCC provisions).
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24s
time when they enact the text. Thus, although it appears that courts
249
give the Official Comments substantial weight, that practice may be
vulnerable from a textualist perspective.
By contrast, the main textualist objections to the use of legislative
history lack bite when applied to the Advisory Committee Notes.
Some textualists argue, with respect to statutes, that the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment!"' deny binding
authority to any text other than that passed by both houses of Con2
gress and signed by the President. 51 In the case of the Rules, of
course, Congress has delegated its authority to the rulemakers, and
the only bicameralism involved in the adoption of most Rules is that
of bicameral inertia. Moreover, the Enabling Act specifically directs
the creation of the Notes and requires that the Notes accompany any
22
or Standing Committees;
recommendations made by the Advisory
obviously, the Constitution includes no such requirement concerning
the transmittal of legislative history. Textualists also can impugn legislative history by pointing to the difficulty of aggregating the intent of
3
individual legislators, and by claiming that the legislators may not
254
By contrast, the
have been aware of the pertinent legislative history.

247, at 14 ("In some states the comments
were not placed before the enacting body prior to adoption of the Code. Indeed,
some of the present comments were not even in existence at the time the section to
which they are now appended was adopted.").
249 See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-102:10,
at 1-52 (1982) ("The case law indicates that courts are more influenced by the Official
Comments than by any other thing, except decided cases on the same matter." (citations omitted)).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
251 This argument has been criticized on the ground that even if the bicameralism
248See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note

and presentment requirements indicate that only the statutory text is "the law," they do
not preclude a court from using other sources to help determine that text's meaning.
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 119, at 230 (noting that critics of Scalia's textualist arguments have conceded that legislative history is not "authoritativein the same way the
statutory text is authoritative: the latter is and has the force of laur, the former is, at
best, evidence of what the law means").
252 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1994) ("[T]he body making [a] recommendation shall
provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body's action, including any minority or other separate views.").
253 See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Legislative
history that does not represent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and
legislative history that does represent the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful.").
254 See, e.g.,
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
judgment) (noting that pertinent portions of the relevant committhe
in
concurring
tee reports, "though they dominate our discussion today, constituted less than a quarter-page of the 82-page House Agriculture Committee Report, and less than a half-
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active examination, and, at times, amendment of the Notes by the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee, as well as the likelihood that the Notes receive scrutiny from at least some members of
the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and (occasionally) Congress, indicate that those who considered and approved the text of the
Rule also considered and approved the accompanying Note.
Other textualist bogeys, similarly, fail to haunt the use of the
Notes. The textualist concern that lobbyists might influence congressional aides to hide rent-seeking language in corners of voluminous
committee reports155 has little application to Notes, which are generally brief (at least as compared to congressional committee reports)
and which are likely to be read carefully at several stages in the approval process. Moreover, the Notes are less susceptible than legislative history to charges of indeterminacy and malleability; 56 the Notes'
relative brevity, the comparative care with which they are drafted,2 7
and the fact that each proposed amendment is ultimately accompanied by only one Note, make the Notes less likely to support multiple
interpretations on a given question. Finally, while legislative history

page each of the 74-page Senate Agriculture Committee Report, the 46-page Senate
Commerce Committee Report, and the 73-page Senate Agriculture Committee Supplemental Report"); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (dismissing statement of House floor manager on the basis that "we do not
know for sure that Representative Edwards' words were even uttered on the floor
rather than inserted into the Congressional Record afterwards").
255 Take for example this objection
by Justice Scalia:
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were inserted, at best by a
committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of
those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what
the bill meant... but rather to influence judicial construction.
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)
256;
See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in
the judgment) (borrowingJudge Harold Leventhal's description of "the use of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one's friends").
257Of course, the Notes on occasion exhibit inconsistencies.
For example, Stephen Burbank has observed that the Note to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 recognized that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11's sanctions provisions "represent[ed] an
expansion of existing authority," while the Note to the 1983 amendments to Rule 26
stated that the corresponding sanctions provision added to Rule 26 in 1983 "merely
codifie [d] existing authority and require [d] the courts to exercise it." Burbank, supra
note 208, at 1001.
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the Notes are readily available on

The Court's Use of the Notes and Comparable Materials

The distinctions discussed above may help to explain the Court's
frequent resort to Notes in construing the Rules. During the last fifteen years-despite the Court's internal debate over textualism in
statutory interpretation-all the Justices have made liberal use of the
Notes. 2 9 As will be seen, however, the Court generally avoids suggesting that the Notes have binding effect; instead, it prefers indeterminate formulations, such as the statement that the Notes are "of
weight" in the interpretation of the Rules. Not only is this view incompatible with the Notes' role in the rulemaking process, but it conflicts with the Court's treatment of two analogous interpretive guides:
the commentary to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and
agencies' interpretations of their own legislative rules.
Since a number of the Justices are generally open to the use of
legislative history, their use of Advisory Committee Notes is not surprising. Justice Scalia, however, is noted for his opposition to the use
of legislative history in statutory construction; not only does he gener6°
ally eschew the use of such history when writing his own opinions,
258

See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 391 (2000)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court's
and
reliance on legislative history on the ground that such history "must be researched
contime
more
considerably
litigation
appellate
makes
counsel-which
by
discussed
v. Anissuming, and hence considerably more expensive, than it need be"); Conroy
that
(reasoning
judgment)
the
in
concurring
(Scalia,J.,
(1993)
519
511,
U.S.
507
koff,
the
the use of legislative history in construing an unambiguous statute "undermines
own
their
of
out
it
for
pay
must
us,
unlike
(who,
litigants
condemns
and
law,
clarity of
pockets) to subsidizing historical research by lawyers").
259 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-17, 625 (1997) (citing Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909
v.
(1997) (unanimous decision) (citing Note to Habeas Corpus Rule 6); United States
Rule
Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77 (1997) (unanimous decision) (citing Note to Federal
(1993)
of Criminal Procedure 32); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 736-37
(quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23 and
39052); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 n.4,
and
91 & n.5 (1993) (citing Note to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)
255,
U.S.
506
States,
United
v.
Crosby
10-401(b));
Rule
Notes to former Bankruptcy
260 (1993) (unanimous decision) (citing Note to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
43).
260 Although Justice Scalia has not always adhered to the strictures of the textualist
approach, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
his658 (1990) ("Probably all of the justices are willing to consult relevant legislative
tory if the statutory text is genuinely ambiguous or open-textured."), it is his predomi-
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but he also writes separately-in cases where he agrees with the result
reached by the Court-to disassociate himself from the Court's use of
legislative history.261 Nonetheless-despite his predominantly textual-

nant approach to interpreting statutes, see, e.g., Schacter, supra note 139, at 642 n.270
('justice Scalia has not entirely foreclosed resort to legislative history in circumstances
that present sufficient statutory ambiguity but seems reluctant to find such circumstances presented."); id. at 658 n.144 ("Even Justice Scalia said in Chan, 109 S. Ct. at
1683, that he might consult legislative history 'to elucidate a text that is ambiguous,'
but there appear to be relatively few texts that he finds 'ambiguous."').
261

See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 390 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring in

the judgment) ("[E]ven if all of the Court's invocations of legislative history were not
utterly irrelevant, I would still object to them, since ... [t]he only reliable indication of
[the intent of the majority of both Houses of Congress] is the words of the bill that
they voted to make law."); United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535 (1998)
(Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court's
reliance on the history of unenacted legislation); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 480-81
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (refusing to
join portions of the Court's opinion that discuss legislative history); Bank One Chi.,
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("I agree with the Court's opinion, except that
portion of it which enters into a discussion of '[t]he drafting history of § 4010."');
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (refusing to join a section
of the Court's opinion that "consists of a discussion of the legislative history of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977"); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507
U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (complaining that "the
Court feels compelled to demonstrate that its holding is consonant with legislative history, including some dating back to 1917"); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 70 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If the Court had applied to the text of the
statute the standard tools of legal reasoning, instead of scouring the legislative history
for some scrap that is on point. . . , it would have reached the same result it does today...."); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("I join in the Court's opinion except for Part
II, which examines in great detail the statute's legislative history.");Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("I join Parts I and IV of the Court's opinion, and Part III except insofar as it relies upon legislative history."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 527-29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (conceding that because a
literal reading of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) would produce an absurd result,
legislative history may be consulted "to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition ... was indeed unthought of," but refusing to join Court's opinion because
the latter uses legislative history to determine "not merely... that the word 'defendant' cannot have been meant literally, but [also] what, precisely, the Rule does
mean"); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (joining the Court's opinion "except that portion which rests upon detailed analysis of" lower court cases cited in statute's legislative
history); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) ("I join the opinion of the Court except Part II-A, which is largely devoted to establishing, through the floor debate in the House, [points which] seem to me so utterly clear from the text of the legislation that there is no justification for resort to the
legislative history."); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
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ist approach to statutory interpretation-Justice Scalia frequently
joins, or even writes, opinions that rely upon Advisory Committee
Notes. In Cooter & Cell, for example, Justice Scalia joined the majority's opinion, which relied on the Notes to resolve two of the three is2 Not
264threview, the Court refor appellate
standard
23
to26the
presented.
Rule ll'sAstext,
sues
lidon
and purposes to hold that a district
,ote,
lied
judge's Rule 11 determinations should be reviewed for abuse of disWith respect to the scope of sanctions, the Court refused to
cretion.
extend Rule 11 to authorize the award of attorney's fees incurred
while defending a Rule 11 sanction on appeal, reasoning that
"[n]either the language of Rule 11 nor the Advisory Committee Note
suggests that the Rule could require payment for any activities outside
266
Likewise, in 1991 Justice
the context of district court proceedings.,
Business Guides that rein
opinion
dissent's
the
of
Scaliajoined a part
and the commentary
history[,]
lied on the text of Rule 11, "the Rule's
that accompanied its adoption" to argue that represented parties
26 7
should not be subject to the Rule's certification requirement. In the
dissenters' view, "the drafters of Rule 11 intended to bind [only] those
26
The dissent
whose signatures are provided for in the Rule itself.,
found negative evidence of this intent in the Advisory Committee
Notes:
If the drafters of the 1983 amendments had intended a radical departure
from prior practice by imposing duties on represented parties that before had been imposed only on attorneys, one might expect discussion

curring in the judgment) (refusing to join Court's opinion because, inter alia, the
Court "undertakes an exhaustive investigation of... legislative history").
262 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990)
("In directing the
that the disindicates
itself
11
Rule
sanction,
'appropriate'
an
district court to impose
trict court is empowered to exercise its discretion.").
263 See id. (quoting the Note's statement that "a district court 'has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case"').
264 See id. at 404 ("The district court is... best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 1l's goal of specific and general deterrence.").
265

Id. at 405.

Id. at 406. The Court bolstered this conclusion by noting that Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38 governed litigants' conduct on appeal, thus "plac[ing] a natural limit on Rule 1l's scope." Id. at 407. The Court argued, moreover, that "[liimiting
Rule Il's scope in this manner accords with the policy of not discouraging meritorious
appeals," id. at 408, and the Court observed that "[a]s Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute, the policies for allowing district courts to require the losing party to pay appellate,
as well as district court attorney's fees, are not applicable," id. at 409.
267 498 U.S. 538, 555 (1991) (Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall, Stevens, & Scalia, JJ.,
266

dissenting).
268

Id. at 556.
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of the change in the Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying the
1983 amendments. But the Notes say nothing of the kind.... The failure to mention the signature of a represented party is a startling omission if such a signature could violate the Rule.

The dissonance between Justice Scalia's approaches to Rules and
to statutes appeared to strike him in 1995, when he refused to join a
part of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Tome v. United States because he
objected to the plurality's use of Advisory Committee Notes to show
"the 'purpose,' .. . or 'intent,' . . . of the draftsmen" of
Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 (d)(1)(B).270 Justice Scalia admitted his own prior use of
such Notes-confessing that "I have previously acquiesced in .... and
indeed myself engaged in..., similar use of the Advisory Committee
Notes"-but concluded that "[m]ore mature consideration has persuaded me that is wrong. 2 '
This conversion, however, did not last
very long:272 in cases decided after TomeJustice Scalia has joined eight
opinions that make substantive use of Notes in interpreting Rules,
269

Id. at 558-59.

513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995). (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the
judgment). Perhaps because Evidence Rule 801 was enacted by Congress in the same
form proposed by the rulemakers, Justice Scalia's opinion discussed Rules promul270

gated by the rulemakers and Rules enacted by Congress as though they presented similar interpretive issues.
27 Id. Justice Scalia made three arguments against
reliance on the Notes. First,
[i]t is the words of the Rules that have been authoritatively adopted-by this Court, or
by Congress if it makes a statutory change." Id. Second, "[l]ike ajudicial opinion and
like a statute, the promulgated Rule says what it says, regardless of the intent of its
drafters." Id. at 168. Finally, "there is no certainty that either we or [Congress] read
[the Notes], nor is there any procedure by which we formally endorse or disclaim

them." Id. These arguments are addressed in Parts III.B.1 and B.2 above.

272 In one subsequent case, the Court distinguished
Tome and refused to take a position on the appropriate weight to be accorded to the Notes. See Libretti v. United
States, 516 U.S. 29, 41 (1995) ("The Tome plurality treated the Advisory Committee's
Notes on Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (B) as relevant evidence of the drafters'
intent as to the meaning of that Rule .... In contrast, Libretti seeks to use the Note appended to Rule 31 to elucidate the meaning of an entirely distinct Rule. We cannot
agree ....).
273 See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 n.4
(2001) (unanimous decision)
(using a Note to illustrate the operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and interpreting Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 in light of its purpose as explained in
the Note); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833-35 & n.15, 838, 841-45 & nn.
20-21, 864 (1999) (relying heavily on Notes in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 208 & n.5 (1999)
(unanimous decision) (citing a Note to underscore the purpose of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 42-43, 45 (1998) (unanimous decision) (stating that "[t]he Advisory Committee notes confirmed" the survival
of the "independent action" under the 1946 amendment to Rule 60(b)); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-17, 625 (1997) (relying extensively on Notes
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and has even argued in dissent that a Note contradicts the majority's
interpretation of a statute.274
Admittedly, the position that Justice Scalia took in Tome contemplates the use of Notes as "persuasive scholarly commentaries," a view
that would permit occasional citation. 75 However, Justice Scalia has
also joined opinions that explicitly use the Notes to decipher, and implement, the Advisory Committee's intent with respect to a particular
Rule. For example, the Court in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. spent more
than three pages reconstructing "what the Advisory Committee must
have assumed would be at least a sufficient set of conditions to justify
binding absent members of a class under Rule 23(b) (1) (B),"276 and
studded its opinion with references to what the Advisory Committee

in construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909
(1997) (unanimous decision) (quoting a Note with respect to purpose of Habeas Rule
6); United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77 (1997) (unanimous decision) (relying
on the explanation given in a Note to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)); id.
at 680 (rejecting a party's argument based on the Note to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(b)(3), because Rule 32(b)(3) "obviously does not deal at all with motions to withdraw guilty pleas, and any comments in the Advisory Committee's Notes to
this Rule dealing with plea withdrawal could not alter the meaning of Rules 11 and
32(e) as we have construed them"); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 658 n.5,
662-64, 669 n.17 (1996) (quoting the 1937 and 1993 Advisory Committee Notes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4).
274Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 255 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined
by
Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that 28
U.S.C. § 2253, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, requires a prisoner seeking review of a final order in a habeas proceeding to seek a certificate-of appealability from "circuitjudges in
their individual capacity," rather than from "the Court of Appeals as such." Hohn, 524
U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
To bolster this argument, Justice Scalia observed that the 1967 Advisory Committee
Notes to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 "explicitly state that '28 U.S.C. § 2253
does not authorize the court of appeals as a court to grant a certificate of probable
cause."' Id. (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting FED. R. APP. P. 22 advisory committee's note (1967)). (The 1967 Advisory
Committee Notes referred to a prior version of § 2253 that contained language similar,
in pertinent part, to that at issue in Hohn.)
275 See, e.g.,
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 449 n.5, 450 (2000) (unanimous
decision) (quoting the 1963 Advisory Committee's Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to show that Rule 50's failure expressly to address the question presented
(whether a court of appeals that determines that ajury verdict cannot be sustained due
to erroneous admission of evidence may order entry of judgment for verdict loser)
"was not inadvertent"); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 432 (1996) (Scalia, J.)
(using a "but sed' cite to Note to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to contradict
whatJustice Scalia asserts is an implication of the dissent's reasoning).
276 527 U.S. 815, 838 (1999) (referring to "the limited
fund class action as understood by the drafters of Rule 23"); see also id. at 838-41 (discussing conditions contemplated by the Advisory Committee).
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"assumed, ''277 "underst[oo]d[],278 and "intended,",27' as well as what the
Committee "looked cautiously at,"280 "did not contemplate,"2 8 1 "would
have thought... surprising, ' , 211 was "concern [ed]" about,2 3 or "did not
envision."2 4 Likewise, the Court's opinion in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor addressed the question of what cases "the Advisory Committee
sought to cover" in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) .
The
Amchem Court observed that "[w]hile the text of Rule 23(b) (3) does
not exclude from certification cases in which individual damages run
high, the Advisory Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of
'the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.' 286 The
Court did note that, despite the Advisory Committee's advice that
mass tort cases "are 'ordinarily not appropriate' for class treatment...
[,] the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases
from class certification, and District Courts, since the late 1970's, have
been certifying such cases in increasing number." 2 7 The Court nonetheless made clear that the text of the Rule was not the only pertinent
consideration: "The Committee's warning... continues to call for
caution when individual
stakes are high and disparities among class
28 8
members great.,

277 See id. at 841-42 ("The Advisory Committee, and presumably the
Congress in

approving subdivision (b) (1) (B), must have assumed that an action with these characteristics would satisfy the limited fund rationale cognizable under that subdivision.");
see also id. at 844 ("It is simply implausible that the Advisory Committee ...would have
uncritically assumed that mandatory versions of such class actions, lacking such protections, could be certified under Rule 23(b) (1) (B).").
278 Id. at 842.
279 Id. at 843; see also id. at 844 n.21 (expressing "doubt
that the Advisory Committee would have intended liberality in allowing such a circumscribed tradition to be
transmogrified by operation of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) into a mechanism for resolving the
claims of individuals not only against the fund, but also against an individual tortfeasor').
280 Id. at 842.
281 Id. at 843.
282 Id. at 845.
Id. at 844 n.20.
Id. at 864.
285 521 U.S. 591,
615 (1997).
286Id. at 617 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1969)). Benjamin Kaplan was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee
that proposed the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, and the Court's opinion in Amchem
cited his views repeatedly. Id. at 613-17.
287Id. at 625 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's
note (1966)).
2ssId. The Court's reliance on the views of the Advisory
Committee is also reflected in its frequent citations to the Notes. See id. at 614-17, 625.
283
284
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In one respect, however, Justice Scalia's comparison of the Notes
to "scholarly commentaries" seems to be an accurate reflection of the
Court's approach. Though the Court is often willing to rely heavily on
the Notes, it has never held them to be binding authority; instead, it
prefers to state vaguely that the construction given to a Rule by its
Note is "of weight" in the analysis. 289 This view is problematic, because
it permits courts to discount the Notes when it seems convenient to do
so. 290 Thus, the Court's unwillingness to treat the Notes as binding
authority invites the criticisms (similar to those Justice Scalia has leveled at legislative history) 291 that reliance on the Notes is mere
"makeweight" and does not constrain the Court.
The Court's treatment of the Notes also contrasts with its handling
of analogous materials. In Stinson v. United States, the Court held that
commentary to the United States Sentencing Guidelines "that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erro92
The Court's explanation for this
neous reading of, that guideline."
holding underscores the Guidelines commentary's similarity to the
Advisory Committee Notes:
The functional purpose of commentary (of the kind at issue here) is to
assist in the interpretation and application of [the Guidelines], which
are within the [Sentencing] Commission's particular area of concern
and expertise and which the Commission itself has the first responsibility
to formulate and announce. In these respects this type of commentary is
akin to an agency's interpretation of its own legislative rules ....
According this measure of controlling authority to the commentary is

289

See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1988) (citing

R. AP'. P. 3 advisory committee's note (1967)); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21,
31 (1986) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note (1966)).
2W The Seventh Circuit's treatment of the deterrence/compensation
issue (with
accomtext
supra
See
illustration.
an
provides
11)
Rule
of
respect to the 1983 version
panying notes 179-97.
1 See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[L]egislative
history is in any event a makeweight; the Court really makes up its mind on the basis of
other factors."); id. at 282 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that "legislative history has produced what it usually produces:
more questions rather than more answers"); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.
200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (asserting that legislative history is "an omnipresent makeweight for decisions arrived at on other grounds"); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
621 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that legislative materials
"are a forensic rather than an interpretive device, to be invoked when they support the
decision and ignored when they do not").
292 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (unanimous decision).
FED.
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consistent with the role the Sentencing Reform Act contemplates for the

Sentencing Commission. The Commission, after all, drafts the guidelines as well as the commentary interpreting them, so we can presume
that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the commentary

represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems
that the guidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guide-

lines Manual as a whole as well as the authorizing statute. 293
The Stinson Court distinguished Advisory Committee Notes from
Guidelines commentary, reasoning that the latter can be "issued well
after the guideline it interprets ha[s] been promulgated," and arguing
that it would be incongruous for the Sentencing Commission to "announce some statement of initial intent" only after the expiration of
the report-and-wait process for congressional review of proposed
Guidelines. 94 However, this distinction suggests, if anything, that the
Notes should be entitled to more deference than Guidelines commentary, because the Notes invariably accompany the proposed Rule
throughout the approval process.
Similarly, adherence to the Notes would avoid problems such as
those created by the Court's doctrine of deference to agency interpretations of legislative rules. The doctrine, as expressed in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., accords an agency's interpretation of a regulation that it has created "controlling weight unless [the interpretation] is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 291 John
Manning has argued that such deference raises a problem of "selfdelegation": "when a lawmaker controls the interpretation of its own
laws, an important incentive for adopting transparent and self-limiting
rules is lost because any discretion created by an imprecise, vague, or
ambiguous law inures to the very entity that created it."2 9 Moreover,
deference "reduces the efficacy of notice-and-comment rulemaking"
by "permit[ting] the agency to promulgate imprecise or vague rules
and to settle upon or reveal their actual meaning only when the
agency implements its rule through adjudication,"2 7 and also raises
problems of notice, to the extent that regulated parties "have [no]
clear picture of relevant legal requirements until such parties have offended them."2
By contrast, if the Advisory Committee Notes are

293

Id. at 45.

294 Id. at 44.
295

325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
supra note 103, at 647-48.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 670.

296 Manning,
297
298
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given binding effect, they could limit courts' future discretion (to the
extent that they clarify or give specificity to the text of the Rules); increase the value of the notice-and-comment process (by explaining
aspects of the proposed amendments); and further the goal of notice
(by providing litigants and judges with an accessible source of guidance concerning the application of the Rules).
The analysis above thus supports the view that the Court should
extend to Advisory Committee Notes the same deference that it has
granted to Guidelines commentary and to an agency's interpretation
of its legislative rules. Such an approach would mean that a court interpreting a Rule should always consult the Note as well as the text
and should attempt to construe the text and Note so that they are
consistent. Where the text and Note are irreconcilable, the text
should trump the Note; but otherwise, the Note should be given binding effect.
CONCLUSION

The seeming paradox referenced in this Article's title-that the
Enabling Act's delegation of rulemaking power actually limits the
Court's interpretive latitude-arises from, and is explained by, the nature of the delegation. The limits of the delegation also impel the Article's doctrinal conclusions: that the Enabling Act's scope constraints
should be enforced by invalidating the offending Rule, where necessary, rather than by applying an avoidance-based interpretation that
distorts the Rule; and that courts should give effect to Advisory Committee Notes unless the Notes conflict with the text of the Rule. Such
an approach would bring the interpretation of Rules into line with the
structure that produces them and would demonstrate the judicial
branch's awareness of the responsibility, as well as the authority, conIn a time when "the court
ferred by the Enabling Act delegation.
,,299
•
clearer judicial recognition of
rulemaking model is under siege,
that responsibility might offer a chance of greater permanency for the
rulemaking process.

2"

Bone, supra note 119, at 888.
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